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UN human rights treaty monitoring reform update: promising OHCHR proposals now to be acted upon by the General Assembly (and the EU)

UN human rights treaty monitoring reform update: promising OHCHR proposals now to be acted upon by the General Assembly (and the EU)



John Morijn, PhD (EUI (Law)) is senior human rights adviser, Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and assistant professor of human rights law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Views expressed in this post are strictly those of the author only, and do not in any way reflect the position of the Dutch government.


A while back I reported on discussions that were (re)started in 2009 about how to revamp the way in which UN human rights treaty monitoring functions. About three years into this debate the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has now published her own long-awaited report. It contains a number of very valuable proposals that, if implemented as a package, would constitute a great leap forward. The report is an admirable piece of work by the High Commissioner and her Office. Yet it also still leaves one or two things to be ironed out and explicated in the process leading up to the likely adoption of a General Assembly resolution. It is therefore important to keep up the pressure. It is also crucial to alert the European Union, which only very recently proudly adopted its Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, that it is now time to practice what is has been preaching for decades and put its money where the mouth is. In particular, footing part of the reasonable bill that will come with strengthening the existing UN human rights monitoring system in line with the High Commissioner’s proposals would seem a natural and desirable move for the EU, simply because it would be fully in line with many of its internal and external policy objectives (and therefore a rather economical way to pursue its enlightened self-interest).


Having learnt from earlier mistakes made by her Office – previous multi-faceted proposals to reform the way in which treaty monitoring functions got to be reduced and identified only with a (perfectly reasonable yet rather far-reaching, and therefore easily criticised) idea to merge the various treaty bodies – the High Commissioner this time took a smart approach. She explicitly presented the report as a ‘compilation’ of ideas tabled by others ‘to identify synergies, linkages and mutual reinforcements’. The selection criteria she used were that, apart from actually strengthening the treaty bodies’ mission to enhance promotion and protection of human rights, the proposals should a) respect the treaties and do not require amendments, b) have been proposed by more than one contributor to the debate and be likely to generate agreement, and c) be compatible with and make for a coherent package with other proposals. This approach has the admirable effect of front-loading and side-lining expected criticism in one move, leaving space for a strategic pick-and-choose among the very numerous proposals tabled.



The key proposals include:


- establishing a comprehensive reporting calendar ensuring strict compliance with human rights treaties and equal treatment of all States parties; this is fleshed out by a proposal to introduce a synchronised 5-year schedule, in which the ten human rights treaties would be paired two-by-two, and according to which States Parties would have to report to a maximum of two treaty bodies a year.


- enhancing independence and impartiality of members, and strengthening the election process


- establishing a structured and sustained approach to capacity building for States parties for their reporting duties


- ensuring continued consistency of treaty body jurisprudence in individual communications


- increasing coordination among the treaty bodies on their work on individual communications and their adoption of common guidelines on procedural questions


- increasing accessibility and visibility of the treaty body system, through webcasting of public meeting and use of other technologies


- a simplified focused reporting procedure to assist States parties to meet their reporting obligations with cost savings for them and the UN while maintaining the quality of the process


- alignment of other working methods to the maximum extent without contradicting the normative specificities of the treaties


- limitation of the length of documentation


This list of proposals makes for a solid and balanced package that should be taken up fully by the UN Member States in their consideration of this matter in the context of the General Assembly. Without taking away from this considerable achievement, I want here to draw attention to a number of interesting aspects to the approach chosen by the High Commissioner, and identify matters that may be worth expanding further in preparing the General Assembly’s resolution:


First, it is surprising that such prominence is given to the importance of independence of treaty body experts. This is a crucial aspect indeed, but evidently politically sensitive as well. Placing so much emphasis on this is to be applauded. Although the different proposals are closely related, this should be considered absolutely foundational.


Second, it has to be said that the High Commissioner’s message and package of proposals contain an interesting tension with regard to the position of treaty bodies. On the one hand she stresses the need to respect the powers of the treaty bodies to decide on their own working methods and rules of procedure. On the other, 5 out of 9 of her proposals effectively (and desirably) prescribe how these working methods should be tailored to strengthen the current function of the system. Why not simply state that treaty bodies are just a means to the overarching end of increasing domestic implementation, and that as such they need to act in a unified way as part of a coherent system tailored to reaching the same goal?


Third, one way in which the position of treaty bodies is definitely maintained in the High Commissioner’s proposals is that it is taken for granted that they will all keep their independent existence. She calculates that to execute her plans the total combined annual meeting time of committees should be increased from the current 73 weeks to 124 weeks. What remains unclear, however, is why this would require 172 different volunteering experts consuming $12.1 million in travel budget alone (almost 25% of the current annual budget for human rights treaty monitoring). Surely it would be more cost-efficient to appoint a number of experts to a standing unified human rights treaty body who could be in Geneva on a full-time basis, perhaps aided by a somewhat expanded staff? It would be advisable for States to ask the High Commissioner’s Office at least to calculate the costs of this option as well. If harmonising the varying periodicities mandated by the different treaties into a unified reporting cycle is found by the High Commissioner to be legally possible, it is hard to see why the same would not apply to merging the treaty bodies whose existence is mandated by the treaties. The current attention paid to this issue by the General Assembly is too good an opportunity to leave this issue completely undiscussed and unexplored.


The tragedy of good ideas is usually that they cost money to implement. The High Commissioner’s ideas are no exception. She estimates the additional annual costs at around $ 50 million/year (at $ 108 million/year, up from the current $ 56 million/year). Who will step up to the plate in the General Assembly and foot the bill?


Just two weeks ago the EU, in its aforementioned new Strategy, solemnly reaffirmed its dedication to the UN human rights system generally, including the human rights treaty monitoring system (see in particular at pp. 4-5: “the EU will continue to speak out in the UN General Assembly against human rights violations”; “the independence and effectiveness of the treaty monitoring bodies is essential”; “The EU and its Member States are committed to raising recommendations of treaty monitoring bodies in bilateral relations with all third countries”; “the EU Member States are equally determined to ensure implementation of such recommendations within their own frontiers”). Clearly, good quality and independently generated UN human rights treaty monitoring output would be beneficial to almost all the EU foreign policy aims set out in the Strategy (cf. pp. 5-24). Crucially, the same goes for its internal policies. Its EU Fundamental Rights Charter explicitly states that it draws on its Member States international obligations (see preamble) and that its own protection level cannot fall below it (see article 53 of the EU Charter). What better way to bolster – on a shoestring – that universal legal minimum than to invest in a UN human rights treaty monitoring system that has, according to the EU’s own recent statements, proven its worth?  It is hoped, therefore, that some space can be found in the EU’s € 1.1 billion 2007-2013 budget for promoting human rights and democracy outside the EU, or else its budget to promote human rights protection within the EU itself.



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Award of Compensation by International Tribunals in Inter-State Cases: ICJ Decision in the Diallo Case

Award of Compensation by International Tribunals in Inter-State Cases: ICJ Decision in the Diallo Case


This week, the International Court of Justice decided that the Democratic Republic of Congo is obliged to pay $95,000 to the Republic of Guinea for material and non-material injury arising out of the DRC’s violations of the human rights of a national of Guinea. The case was an old fashioned case of diplomatic protection brought by one State in respect of violations of international law committed towards its nationals by another State. The ICJ decided the case on the merits in 2010 and held that while DRC had violated the rights of Mr Diallo under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and under the African Charter of Human Rights. In 2007, the Court rejected the admissibility of claims brought by Guinea on behalf of companies/firms in which Mr Diallo had an interest. I have a comment about this recent judgment and will then pose a couple of question to readers. The questions will form part of what I hope will be a regular series of trivia questions about international law on the blog. I will have more to say about that series in a future post. For now, let me say that we have a prize on offer to induce you to take part in answering the questions.


In it’s commentary to Art. 36 of the Articles on State Responsibility (which deals with compensation), the International Law Commission noted that: “Of the various forms of reparation, compensation is perhaps the most commonly sought in international practice.” (p. 99, para. 2) However, it is interesting to note that this is not so in the practice of ICJ cases. There, it is the declaration of non-compliance that is often sought. I am not sure why this is so.


The ICJ’s judgment of this week is only the second time that the Court has decided on the amount of compensation owed by a State to another with respect to violations of international law found by the Court. The only previous case in which the Court has done this was the ICJ’s first contentious case – The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), (1949). Sometimes, parties will reserve the right to ask the Court for compensation but then fail to do so. In the late 1980s, Nicaragua was poised to pursue its compensation claim after its successful case against the US with regard to Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. In fact, Nicaragua had filed its memorial on compensation in which it claimed billions of US dollars, and the Court had written to Nicaragua to say it was minded to fix oral hearings on compensation for October 1990. However, in 1990 there was a change of government in Nicaragua which led to a decision to drop the compensation claim. Last year, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega who was President at the time of the acts in the 1980s and reelected in 2006 proposed a referendum on whether Nicaragua ought to revive the compensation claim.


ICJ cases are, of course, inter-State cases. In tribunals dealing with mixed claims, i.e  claims by individuals or corporations against a State, compensation is often sought and awarded. This is true both with regard to human rights claims and investment treaty arbitration. As the Diallo  case was a case of diplomatic protection (a rare recent example) it is comparable to the mixed claims where the seeking and granting of compensation is rather common. Indeed, there are many instances of States seeking and being awarded compensation in cases of diplomatic protection. In the past few decades, examples would include the work of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.


Comments by readers as to why States rarely seek compensation in inter-State case, which do not involve diplomatic protection would be welcome. I also have a more specific question for readers. In the last 30 years (an arbitrary cut off date), have there been any awards of compensation by international tribunals in inter-State cases where the award of compensation was for a direct injury to the State arising from a violation of international law? To clarify, I am asking for cases where compensation was awarded by an international tribunal to one State for violation by another State of international law other than cases of diplomatic protection. So, a case like the Diallo case would not count?



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Competing Views on Libya’s Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC

Competing Views on Libya’s Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC

Over at Opinio Juris, Kevin Jon Heller notes that the debate which he, Jens David Ohlin and I have had regarding whether Libya can postpone it’s obligation to surrender Saif Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court is now being waged by organs of the ICC. As Kevin notes:

Two organs of the Court have now weighed in on the issue, with a rather ironic inversion: the Office of the Prosecutor takes the position that Libya is under no obligation to surrender Saif, while the Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence, which is representing Saif, argues that it does have such an obligation.

The motions are a study in contrasts.  The OTP’s motion is a mere six pages, noting that Article 95 refers to postponements of requests under Part IX of the Rome Statute, a part that applies to both requests for surrender and other forms of cooperation, and analogizing Article 95 to Article 89(2), which allows surrender to be postponed when a suspect brings a ne bis in idem challenge in a national court.  It’s a very underwhelming motion, and I don’t say that simply because I disagree with it.  Had the OTP relied much more heavily on Dapo and Jens’s arguments, the motion would have been much stronger.

Kevin goes on to note that the OPCD motion makes arguments similar to his arguments in his Opinio Juris points on the issue and indeed cites his posts. In addition to the filings by these two organs of the ICC, there is a third motion on this question, which was recently filed before the ICC. This is the request by the National Transitional Council of Libya for the ICC to postpone or suspend the obligation to surrender Saif Gaddafi. Libya’s previous requests for postponement of the surrender obligation were rejected by the ICC (see my earlier post). Those requests were made at a time when Libya had not contested the admissibility of the ICC proceedings. However, Libya has now challenged the admissibility of the proceedings against Saif Gaddafi. Libya asserts that the case against Saif and Al Sanussi are inadmissible because Libya’s “national judicial system is actively investigating Mr Gaddafi and Mr Al-Senussi for their alleged criminal responsibility for multiple acts  . . .  amounting to crimes against humanity.” Libya’s admissibility challenge changes the picture significantly as it is now entitled to rely on Article 95 of the ICC statute which explicitly applies where admissibility has been challenged.

The question that arises is whether Article 95, which permits postponement of a State’s obligation to cooperate with the ICC extends to the obligation of surrender. Libya (and the OTP) argue that Art. 95 does. Libya argues that interpreting Article 95 as permitting postponement of the obligation of surrender upholds the principle of complementarity. This is a point that I made in my previous EJIL:Talk! post and which I develop more fully in my recent article on this issue published earlier this month in the Journal of International Criminal Justice. Indeed, Libya cites and rely on both my post and on my article.

Of the three motions on the issue of postponement of Libya’s obligation of surrender, only the motion of the OPCD addresses the question of the source of Libya’s obligation to cooperate with the ICC. The OPCD argues that since Libya is not a party to the ICC Statute, it is not entitled to rely on Art. 95 of the ICC Statute. The argument is based on the fact that Libya’s obligation of cooperation is derived not from the ICC Statute but from the UN Security Council resolution that refers the Libyan situation to the ICC. In its previous decisions in the Saif case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has implicitly assumed that Libya is entitled to rely on the exceptions in Part 9 of the ICC Statute to the obligation of cooperation. The OPCD motion invites the ICC to rule on this issue explicictly. In my article, I argue that the SC can indeed impose an obligation of cooperation with the ICC which goes beyond what is in the ICC Statute. However, I also argue that the SC has not (yet) done this, and Libya’s (and Sudan’s) obligation to cooperate with the ICC is an obligation to cooperate in accordance with the ICC Statute. Thus entitling Libya to rely on exceptions within the Statute.

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Kiobel: Universal Civil Jurisdiction under international Law

Kiobel: Universal Civil Jurisdiction under international Law



 Barrie Sander has law degrees from Cambridge and Leiden, and from September 2012 will be a PhD candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.


In an earlier post, I considered the question of corporate liability under international law in light of the case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum (“Kiobel”), which is currently before the US Supreme Court.  Kiobel, a case brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), concerns claims that various Shell entities (“the respondents”) planned, conspired and facilitated extrajudicial executions, torture and crimes against humanity by Nigeria in the Niger Delta between 1992 and 1995.


It had been thought that the question of whether corporations may be sued under the ATS would be the central issue before the Supreme Court in Kiobel. However, during oral argument the Justices became preoccupied with the wider issue of the extraterritorial nature of the ATS. In particular, they focussed on the question  whether US federal courts may rely on the ATS to exercise jurisdiction over human rights abuses which have no connection to the US, i.e. abuses committed by non-US entities against non-US victims on non-US territory.  In short, is universal civil jurisdiction permissible under the ATS?  Such was the focus of the Justices on the extraterritorial reach of the ATS that on 5 March 2012, only one week after hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court ordered briefing and re-argument on:



“[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”


Prior to this order, almost all briefing on this issue had been submitted by the respondents and their supporters, who have argued that broad assertions of universal civil jurisdiction by US federal courts may violate international law. In this post I consider some of the counter-arguments that the petitioners and their supporters may seek to raise in response. I suggest that though reliance on the Lotus principle, which would require a rule prohibiting an exercise of jurisdiction (rather than one permitting jurisdiction) may initially seem attractive, that approach is likely to fail. The strongest point that may be put in support of universal civil jurisdiction is that the existence of universal criminal jurisdiction contemplates a degree of civil jurisdiction as well.


The position of the respondents on universal civil jurisdiction 


The respondents’ case appears to be based on the assumption that in order for a US federal court to have civil jurisdiction over grave human rights violations committed outside the US, it is first necessary to identify an express rule of international law permitting the assertion of such jurisdiction. Since customary international law does not support the existence of such a rule, assertions of universal civil jurisdiction by US federal courts breach international law.


This perspective is expressly affirmed in an amicus curiae brief submitted by the UK and Netherlands. These governments asserted that:



the right of the United States or any other sovereign to create and enforce such a domestic remedy depends on it being able to satisfy the proper jurisdictional limits recognized by international law. […] The Governments believe that there is no basis under international law for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction against the Respondents for the conduct charged in the complaint”.


The point is also made, quite forcefully, in a brief by Chevron in which it stated that:



Under international law, a nation’s sovereignty over activities within its territory is presumptively absolute, subject to exceptions by national consent. Nations […] have not, however, consented to allow a foreign court to entertain civil causes of action on the basis of universal jurisdiction, as is done in ATS cases.


It is also worth noting that this perspective is shared by the UK House of Lords. In the case of Jones v Saudi Arabia, Lord Bingham, criticising the decision of the Court of Appeal which had allowed a suit in respect of acts of torture allegedly committed by Saudi Arabian officials outside the UK, stated that:



The court asserted what was in effect a universal tort jurisdiction in cases of official torture […], for which there was no adequate foundation in any international convention, state practice or scholarly consensus […] Despite the sympathy that one must of course feel for the claimants if their complaints are true, international law, representing the law binding on other nations and not just our own, cannot be established in this way.


The Lotus dictum – an attractive but ultimately unpersuasive starting point for the petitioners


In response, one starting point for the petitioners could be to challenge the very assumption upon which the respondents base their case, namely that the onus is on the petitioners to identify an international legal norm permitting the assertion of universal civil jurisdiction.


For this purpose, the petitioners could argue that rather than requiring the petitioners to identify the existence of a permissive rule, international law places the onus on the respondents to identify a prohibitive rule. Pursuant to this theory, an assertion of universal civil jurisdiction by the US courts would be presumed lawful so long as a prohibitive rule of international law to the contrary had not crystallised.


It is conceded that in the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal noted that the “very broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction [under the ATS] […] has not attracted the approbation of States generally”. For example, in the US Supreme Court case of Sosa v Alvarez Machain (“Sosa”), the UK, Switzerland and Australia protested to the jurisdiction of the US courts, while in Kiobel, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany all submitted briefs in support of the respondents.


However, it would be open to the petitioners to point out that the assertion of broad forms of jurisdiction under the ATS has equally not attracted the criticism of States generally. For example, in Filartiga v Pena-Irala, a case concerning a claim for damages for alleged torture of a Paraguayan national by a Paraguayan police official, Paraguay did not object to the jurisdiction of the US courts. In Kiobel itself, the US government submitted a brief in support of the petitioners.


In this light, the response of States to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction under the ATS may best be characterised as mixed, and certainly insufficiently uniform to crystallise into a prohibitive rule. With this in mind, the petitioners could assert that in the absence of such a prohibitive rule, the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction by US federal courts is lawful under international law.


The basis for this approach may be traced back to the following dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case:



Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”


The Lotus dictum is attractive for the petitioners since it purports to place the burden of proof on the respondents to identify a prohibitive rule. Yet, for all its attractiveness, it is submitted that the Lotus dictum is ultimately unpersuasive for two reasons.


First, the Lotus approach does not reflect State practice. In particular, as noted by Lowe and Staker, in over a century of objections to exercises of universal jurisdiction, there does not appear to be a single instance of an objecting State seeking to prove the existence of a prohibitive rule forbidding assertions of universal jurisdiction:



When States object to exercises of jurisdiction, they simply assert that the other State has ‘no right’ to exercise jurisdiction in the way that it claims. State practice is consistently based upon the premiss that it is for the State asserting some novel extraterritorial jurisdiction to prove that it is entitled to do so.


Second, as noted by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case, the Lotus dictum “represents the high water mark of laissez-faire in international relations” and is therefore best considered a product of its time, which has little or no relevance to contemporary international law.


The Opinion of Justice Stephen Breyer in Sosa – a stronger starting point for the petitioners


A stronger starting point for the petitioners would be to point to the Opinion of Justice Stephen Breyer in Sosa. Justice Breyer noted that it is generally accepted that there exists “procedural agreement” amongst the international community to criminally prosecute a subset of universally condemned behaviour, including torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In light of this consensus concerning universal criminal jurisdiction, Justice Breyer further noted the following:



The fact that this procedural consensus exists suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation’s courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That consensus concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening. […] That is because the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover damages, in the criminal proceeding itself. […] Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well.


In this passage, Justice Breyer drew on the practice of many civil law States, which permit victims of crime to attach civil claims for compensation to criminal prosecutions (so-called action civiles), to conclude that the international community’s consensus regarding universal criminal jurisdiction “necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well”. At the international level, this assertion is also supported by the fact that, pursuant to Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has the power to:



make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”


Justice Breyer’s position is also supported by two further arguments.


First, as noted by Donovan and Roberts, “[p]unishment and compensation represent two distinct, but complementary, ways of condemning past, and deterring future, wrongdoing”. In this regard, the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction is consistent with the justifications put forward for the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction under international law. The assertion of universal criminal jurisdiction has traditionally been justified either as responding to crimes that attack the fundamental values of the international community (e.g. genocide) or where crimes would otherwise go unpunished if universal jurisdiction did not exist (e.g. piracy). As Yee has noted, in both cases the assertion of universal jurisdiction refers to the exercise of domestic jurisdiction based on a “universal concern” of the international community. The recognition of the need to respond to such universal concerns justifies the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction just as much as it justifies universal criminal jurisdiction.


Second, several instruments in the human rights field now oblige States to afford an effective remedy to human rights victims.  For a full review of these instruments, I would refer readers to the brief submitted by Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In this regard, the growing importance of the provision of reparation as an element of the right to an effective remedy further supports the view that the international community’s acceptance of universal criminal jurisdiction should encompass a degree of universal civil jurisdiction, at least in respect of the same range of conduct.


The re-argument hearing is scheduled to take place during the court’s next term, which begins in October. Whether the US Supreme Court will be receptive to submissions in favour of universal civil jurisdiction remains to be seen.



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Warmongering won’t settle this old dispute/Actitudes Belicistas no resolverán esta vieja disputa

Warmongering won’t settle this old dispute/Actitudes Belicistas no resolverán esta vieja disputa


In the 21st century, Britain should rethink its hostile approach towards Argentina.


By Alicia Castro



After more than three years without an Argentine Ambassador to the United Kingdom, I have just taken up that responsibility. My government is keen to seize this moment to rebuild and strengthen bilateral relations. My extensive experience, first in the trade union movement, then in parliament and as a diplomat has made me a strong advocate of dialogue and positive negotiations. I am, however, facing a campaign that “celebrates” a war that took place 30 years ago and warmongering, disrespectful and aggressive language that obstructs dialogue.



The sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK is 179 years old. It dates from the time that Great Britain – in much the same way it invaded Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807 without success – invaded and took the Malvinas Islands by force in 1833. Until then, the islands had been ruled by 32 Spanish governors and, after our independence, were effectively administered by Argentina. Who is interested in prolonging this conflict today?



Since 1965 the United Nations has recognised the existence of a special colonial situation in the Malvinas Islands, and the dispute between Argentina and the UK concerning their sovereignty. It has urged both countries to negotiate to find a peaceful and permanent solution.



The principle of self-determination does not apply to this special situation, because Britain expelled the Argentine authorities and population from the islands, implanted its own population and has strictly controlled the demographics of the islands through its immigration policy. No UN resolution related to the “Malvinas/Falklands Question” has ever referred to self-determination. It is a special case that involves a colonial territory, not a colonised population. We are not willing to take away the Britishness and the way of life of the 3,000 inhabitants of the islands. We are claiming sovereignty to a territory that belonged to Spain and then to Argentina as its legitimate successor, in accordance with the principle of succession of states in international law.



Between 1965 and 1982, the UK and Argentina held negotiations regarding sovereignty that contemplated several options, such as leaseback and joint administration. We agreed on some practical measures such as economic and transport links that made significant improvement to the islanders’ lives. Argentina built the airfield in the Malvinas Islands and a state-owned airline provided regular services between the islands and the Argentine mainland; scholarships were granted to those who wished to study on the mainland and Argentine teachers were assigned to the islands to teach Spanish; the inhabitants of the islands also had free health care at the British Hospital in Buenos Aires.


(Fuente: The Telegraph)


ACTITUDES BELICISTAS NO RESOLVERÁN ESTA VIEJA DISPUTA

Por Alicia Castro


Después de más de tres años sin Embajador argentino ante  el Reino Unido, he llegado a hacerme cargo de nuestra misión. Mi gobierno ve este momento como una oportunidad de reconstruir y profundizar la relación bilateral. Vengo de una larga experiencia sindical, parlamentaria y diplomática que me orienta al dialogo y a las negociaciones positivas. Me encuentro, sin embargo, frente a una campaña celebratoria de una guerra ocurrida hace treinta años,  y a un lenguaje belicista, irrespetuoso y agresivo que obstaculiza el dialogo.


El conflicto de soberanía entre Argentina y el Reino Unido ha cumplido 179 anos, desde que Inglaterra –así como antes ocupó Buenos Aires en 1806 y 1807 sin triunfar en su objetivo-  invadió y tomó por un acto de fuerza también a las islas Malvinas en 1833. Hasta entonces, las islas habían tenido 32 gobernadores españoles y, luego de nuestra independencia, quedaron bajo administración argentina efectiva. ¿A quién le interesa hoy prolongar este conflicto?
Desde 1965 las Naciones Unidas reconocieron la existencia de un caso colonial especial en las islas Malvinas, que constituye una disputa de soberanía entre Argentina y el Reino Unido, e instaron a las partes a negociar  para encontrar una solución pacífica y permanente a la controversia.


El principio de auto-determinación no se aplica a esta situación especial, porque Gran Bretaña expulsó a las autoridades argentinas y a la población de las islas, implantó su propia población y ha controlado estrictamente la demografía de las islas a través de su política de inmigración. Ninguna resolución de las Naciones Unidas relacionada con la “Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas/Falklands” se ha referido nunca a la auto-determinación. Es un caso especial que involucra a un territorio colonial, no una población colonizada. No deseamos quitarles la condición de británicos ni su estilo de vida a los 3000 habitantes de las islas. Estamos reclamando la soberanía sobre un territorio que perteneció a España y luego a Argentina como sucesor legítimo, de acuerdo con el principio de sucesión de los Estados en el derecho internacional.


Entre los años 1965 y 1982 el Reino Unido y Argentina mantuvieron negociaciones en lo referente a la soberanía, que contempló varias opciones, tales como retroarriendo (“leaseback”) y administración conjunta, y acordamos medidas prácticas estableciendo vínculos económicos y de transporte, que permitieron una mejora significativa en la vida de los isleños. Argentina construyó la pista de aterrizaje en las Islas Malvinas, una aerolínea de propiedad estatal proveyó servicios regulares entre las Islas y el territorio continental argentino, otorgó becas  a aquellos que deseaban estudiar en el continente y profesores argentinos fueron enviados a las islas para enseñar Castellano; los habitantes de las islas asimismo obtuvieron asistencia médica gratuita en el Hospital Británico en Buenos Aires.


Después de la guerra de 1982, las Naciones Unidas continuaron exhortando a las dos partes a negociar.


Nadie tiene que recordarnos a los argentinos cuan estúpida y cruel  fue esa guerra. La junta que de facto gobernó a la Argentina -que  torturó y asesinó a miles de argentinos para imponer un modelo económico de ajuste y miseria- pretendió  sin éxito utilizar la guerra para mejorar su imagen y mantenerse en el poder.


Al ignorar los reiterados llamados de las Naciones Unidas, la OEA, el Mercosur,  la Unasur,  la CELAC,  las Cumbres Iberoamericanas, America del Sur- Países Árabes y America del Sur -África, el Grupo de los 77 más China, y los Premios Nobel de la Paz, el Reino Unido muestra su desapego a las normas internacionales de resolución de conflictos,  uno de los principios fundamentales del derecho internacional. Al no proponer ningún medio para resolver esta disputa, Gran Bretaña está adoptando una posición que no es solamente hostil, sino también ilegal.


Recientemente, la situación de ha deteriorado aún más con la militarización del Atlántico Sur por parte del Reino Unido, su otorgamiento unilateral de licencias de pesca por períodos de 25 años y la exploración de hidrocarburos en la plataforma continental argentina.


> Como dice nuestra presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner  “Malvinas es una causa nacional, una causa regional y global”. Al negarse a negociar con Argentina, el Reino Unido le da la espalda a América Latina en su conjunto.  No habrá forma de revitalizar la relación con nuestra región sin resolver la cuestión Malvinas, el anacrónico enclave colonial que subsiste al sur de nuestro continente.


Nuestra región y el mundo apoyan los esfuerzos de Argentina por entablar un diálogo constructivo, que tenga en cuenta y respete los intereses de los isleños y su estilo de vida. Queremos dejar atrás las políticas que caracterizaron al siglo XIX, el orden colonial que permitía el uso de la fuerza, el sometimiento del más débil y la apropiación de recursos ajenos. Proponemos en cambio llevar adelante una  política del siglo XXI, construir un orden mundial multipolar que promueva la paz, el respeto, la democracia, la soberanía y el desarrollo sustentable con equidad.


El Reino Unido y la República Argentina tienen la oportunidad de dar un ejemplo al mundo resolviendo este conflicto por la vía pacífica y diplomática. Tenemos, por sobre todo, la responsabilidad de no dejar este conflicto sin resolver a las próximas generaciones.


Alicia Castro
Embajadora Argentina ante el Reino Unido


 



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Symposium on ExtraTerritorial Jurisdiction

Symposium on ExtraTerritorial Jurisdiction


One of the topics that will be taught in any basic course on public international law is “Jurisdiction”. By this is meant the jurisdiction of States and as Rosalyn Higgins explains in her book Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, questions of State jurisdiction are questions relating to allocation of competence. The question is which State has the competence to regulate persons, property and events. Questions of jurisdiction will often arise, in the first place, in the relations between States and private persons, as those persons argue that this or that State ought not to apply its law or its judicial powers to the activities of that person. However, since jurisdiction is about the allocation of competence between States, jurisdictional disputes often, and almost inevitably, become inter-State disputes.


There were numerous inter-State disputes on jurisdiction from the 1970s till the end of the 20th century about the United States’ application of the effects doctrine to economic regulation (primarily competition or anti-trust law) and about US extraterritorial application of its sanctions laws (eg sanctions on the Soviet Union in the early 80s or on Cuba or Iran in the mid 90s). There appeared to be a lull on those types of disputes and accommodations seem to have been reached. However, the rise of international criminal law at the end of that century and the increased resort to universal jurisdiction has led to a different set of inter-State disputes about extraterritorial State jurisdiction. In this area, it is European States -the main complainants in disputes with the US – that have most often been the object of complaints of overreaching. Those complaints have been voiced (often very loudly) by African States, by Israel, by Latin American States, and also by the US. Recent developments suggest disputes over jurisdiction are not going away and are as prevalent as ever. In some contexts it is thought that the adoption of international law rules in an area of law would reduce the disputes about jurisdiction (since harmonization of substantive law means that whoever does regulate would apply the same rules anyway). But the debates surrounding the application of universal jurisdiction for international crimes shows that acceptance of common international law rules on matters of substance does not necessarily mean that there won’t be questions as to who gets to interpret, apply and enforce those roles.


Next week, EJIL:Talk! will be hosting a symposium highlighting recent developments with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Contributions to the symposium will focus on recent cases in three different jurisdictions each of which raises questions about the proper scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.


Jacques Hartmann, from the Southern Danish University, who contributed his first post to EJIL:Talk! this week, returns next week to discuss a recent decision of the European Court of Justice dealing with the legality of the extraterritorial application of EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. As he discusses, one of the most contentious aspects of the EU’s scheme, which is aimed at combating climate change, is the application of EU regulations to foreign airlines with respect to their activity outside the EU. This dispute has led to a threat of sanctions against the EU by many countries and media reports suggest there is a trade war looming and that the dispute might even be a deal breaker for global climate change negotiations. Some countries, including China, have forbidden their airlines from participating in the EU scheme.


Barrie Sander, who also contributed his first post to EJIL:Talk! this week, will also return next week to continue his discussion of the Kiobel case in the US Supreme Court. Next week, he will turn to the question of universal civil jurisdiction. Rather surprisingly, the US Supreme Court decided, propio motu, to ask the parties to submit additional briefs on the question of the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute (see post at Lawfare here). If the Court were to decide against extraterritoriality here, it would put paid to three decades of litigation under the Act. It is important to note that even before the Supreme Court’s request, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, had already filed amicus briefs in the case objecting to the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute (see the post by former US State Dept Legal Adviser, John Belliger over at Lawfare, here,  with links to briefs).


Christopher Gevers of the University of KwaZulu Natal will also contribute a post discussing a recent South African case which raises questions of universal (criminal) jurisdiction. He will discuss a case in which attempts are being made to require South African prosecutors to open an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe. That case, and Christopher’s post, raise questions about the scope of universal jurisdiction even where it is accepted that States have such jurisdiction for international crimes. Many States, like South Africa, require the presence of an accused person before proceedings can be initiated against him or her. But does this presence requirement mean that it is not permissible to investigate the alleged crimes without presence? If an investigation cannot be opened without presence, would the exercise of universal jurisdiction ever be possible in practice?


These three contributions demonstrate that disputes about the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction arise in quite a broad range of contexts. First of all, there are a broad range of countries involved in these disputes. The disputes are not confined to the typical Western Europe vs United States context of the late 20th century, and even the Europe vs US disputes are not unidirectional since Europe can also be the object of complaints. Also, these posts demonstrate that debate about extraterritoriality arises not only with regard to criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings and in respect of administrative regulation. Finally, there was a time when disputes about some forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction were really disguised forms of disputes about the substantive rules being applied y States (eg objections to US treble damages for arise antitrust violations, or objections to US sanctions on Cuba and Iran). However, the three cases to be discussed next week all relate to areas in which there is some sort of international regulation (international criminal law, human rights law, climate change). However, that has not stopped the disputes about unilateral application of such law.


We hope you will take part in the conversation engendered by this symposium.



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ICC Prosecutor Decides that He Can’t Decide on the Statehood of Palestine. Is He Right?

ICC Prosecutor Decides that He Can’t Decide on the Statehood of Palestine. Is He Right?


On Tuesday, the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court issued a statement denying the Prosecutor’s competence to decide on Palestine’s acceptance of ICC jurisdiction. The ICC Prosecutor indicated in his statement that he could not take any action as a result of the declaration made by the Palestinian National Authority in January 2009, accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes committed on the territory of Palestine. The declaration by the Palestinian Authority was made under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute. That provision allows States that are not party to the ICC Statute to accept the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes committed on the territory of that State or by its nationals. If the Palestinian declaration were accepted as a basis for ICC jurisdiction, it would grant the ICC jurisdiction over all ICC crimes (genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity) committed on Palestinian territory since July 2002. Crucially, the declaration would give the Court jurisdiction not only over acts of Palestinians but also over acts by Israeli officials and nationals in Gaza and the West Bank. The key question with regard to the Palestinian declaration is whether Palestine is a State, since only States may make declarations under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute. In his one and a half page statement, the Prosecutor has decided that:



“competence  for  determining  the  term  “State”  within  the meaning of article 12 rests, in the first instance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, in case of doubt,  will  defer  to  the  guidance  of  General Assembly. The  Assembly  of States Parties of the Rome Statute could also in due course decide to address the matter in accordance with article 112(2)(g) of the Statute.”


In short, it has taken the Prosecutor over three years to decide that it is not up to him to decide the question of the statehood of Palestine. The Prosecutor’s decision that it is up to the organs of the UN or to the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC Statute to decide on the statehood of Palestine, even in the context of decisions relating to the ICC is reasonable, both from the political and legal points of view. To the extent that the Prosecutor is asking throwing this explosive decision back to States, the Prosecutor is seeking to safeguard himself and his office from allegations that he is taking political decisions. However, there are questions as to whether this reasonable decision is legally correct. Oddly, an important factor, ignored by the Prosecutor is Palestine’s admission to UNESCO (see previous EJIL:Talk! post on that issue here). At first glance, the admission of Palestine to UNESCO seems most unrelated to questions to do with the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, as explained below, and by Bill Schabas on his blog last year, UNESCO’s decision may be highly relevant.



The Prosecutor’s view that the UN Secretary General and General Assembly have responsibility for taking the decision on the Statehood of Palestine is based on the view that the question whether an entity is State for the purposes of the ICC Statute has to receive a uniform answer. In the Prosecutor’s view, whether an entity is a State that can make a declaration under Article 12(3) is the same question as to whether that entity is a State such that it can accede to the ICC Statute (under Article 125, ICC Statute) and refer matters to the Court (under Article 12(1)). For him, the same procedure must be followed in answering those questions. It is the UN Secretary General that acts as the depositary of the ICC Statute and that has responsibility for accepting ratifications of, and accessions to, that treaty by States. Under Article 125 of the Statute, accession to the Statute is open to “all States”.  Whenever an entity claiming to be a State seeks to accede to the treaty, it is the UN Secretary General that will decide, in the first place, whether to accept that instrument of accession or not. It does not seem to follow that because the Secretary General has responsibility for deciding on questions of accession to the Statute, he must also be the one that decides on declarations made by States under Article 12(3). The SG has to decide on question of statehood in order to perform his administrative function as a depositary but that does not give him overall competence on this question. For example, no one would assert that if the question of statehood came up with regard to immunity of third States under Art. 98, it is the UN SG that should decide that question. Presumably, in that context it would be the judicial organs of the court that would make the claim. One may even suggest that since it is the ICC Registrar that performs the statutorye function of receiving Art. 12(3) declarations, he or she is in the same position as the SG with regard to accessions and it is he or she that must, in the first place, decide on whether to accept the declaration, subject perhaps to being overruled by other organs of the ICC.


Even if the Prosecutor is right that the same procedure must be used with regard to determining statehood, whether one is dealing with Art. 12(3) declarations or accessions, it is arguable that UN practice already provides an answer on whether Palestine should be regarded as a State for these purposes. I do not mean to suggest that there is a definitive answer but only to suggest that the Prosecutor’s analysis does not seem complete and that there is more to be said here.


The phrase used in the ICC Statute that “all States” can accede to the Statute is quite common in treaty practice. However, this “all States” formula has given rise to problems in the past in determining which entities in particular qualify as States and therefore have a right to accede to the treaty question. The UN Secretary General has stated that:



“If he were to receive an instrument of accession from any such area, he would be in a position of considerable difficulty unless the [General] Assembly gave him explicit directives on the areas coming within the “any State” or “all States” formula. He  would not wish to determine, on his own initiative, the highly political and controversial question of whether or not the areas whose status was unclear were States. Such a determination, he believed, would fall outside his competence. He therefore stated that when the “any State” or “all States” formula was adopted, he would be able to implement it only if the General Assembly provided him with the complete list of the States coming within the formula, other than those falling within the “Vienna formula”, i.e. States that are Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice” [see Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1, para 81,  cited by ICC Prosecutor]


Thus, the UN SG has indicated that he would look to the General Assembly in cases of particular difficulty. The General Assembly has endorsed this practice of the SG when it adopted an understanding in 1973 in which the GA stated that:



“the Secretary-General, in discharging his functions as a depositary of a convention with an ‘all States’ clause, will follow the practice of the Assembly in implementing such a clause and, whenever advisable, will request the opinion of the Assembly before receiving a signature or an instrument of ratification or accession.” [ see Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1, para 82]


So far, all of this appears to support the Prosecutor’s view that it is for the SG to decide on statehood issues which arise in the context of treaties in which he is depositary, but that in contentious cases the SG will defer to the General Assembly. However, the key question is when is General Assembly guidance required? The ICC Prosecutor states in relation to Palestine that:



“In instances where it is controversial or unclear whether an applicant constitutes a ‘State’, it is the practice of the Secretary-General to follow or seek the General Assembly’s directives on the matter.”


He derives this from the practice referred to above. However, the question is what does controversial mean? Clearly, the question of Palestinian statehood is controversial. This cannot be disputed. However, further analysis of UN practice suggests, that the SG only looks to the GA for guidance in cases of States which fall outside what is known as the “Vienna formula”. The Vienna formula which is referred to in the Summary of Practice referred to above, is the formulation found in Art. 81 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This formula refers to States that are members of the UN,  or any UN specialised agency, or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Where an entity falls within the Vienna formula, the SG deems that it is a State and he will accept accession by that State. This much should be clear from the quotes above. The point also emerges from an Opinion of the UN Legal Counsel of Feb. 1974 where it was stated that:



“the reference in [a particular resolution] to “all States” is to be understood as referring to States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency and States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and also to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam [which the GA had specifically designated as State in the previous year].” [p. 158, para. 4]


All of this is relevant because, though Palestine is not a member of the UN, it has now become a member of one UN agency – UNESCO (see previous post here). This means that Palestine is now within the Vienna formula and, under previous practice, can accede to treaties open to all States (see Bill Schabas’ post on this here), even without reference to the UN GA. It also appears that, under previous practice, the UN SG would not have to refer to the UNGA. If the Prosecutor had not taken so long to decide on this issue (over three years!), he could have safely come to the conclusion that the matter is so controversial that it is for the political organs of the UN (or the ICC) to decide on the question. However, the admission of Palestine to a UN specialised agency last year might have changed this. It may seen strange that admission to UNESCO could be so influential. However, the reason why the “Vienna formula” includes States that are members of a UN agency is that the composition of these agencies is very similar to that of the UN General Assembly. This means that if faced with a decision on the question of statehood, the UN GA is likely to give the same answer as that given by UN specialised agencies. The difference betrween membership of the UN itself and membership of a UN Specialised Agency is that the former requires Security Council approval which means that it is subject to a veto by a permanent member.


One last point is the Prosecutor’s point that the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute can decide on the Palestinian declaration. This is not specifically provided for in the ICC Statute but the Prosecutor refers to a catch all clause on the functions of the Assembly – Art. 112(2)(g) which provides that the Assembly shall:



“perform any other function consistent with the Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”


If the UN GA can give direction to the SG in the performance of his depositary functions it would seem reasonable that the Assembly can also do this. Whether this would be binding would be another matter.



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The ‘left-to-die boat’: whose responsibility for the death of 63 migrants in the Mediterranean?

The ‘left-to-die boat’: whose responsibility for the death of 63 migrants in the Mediterranean?



 Francesco Messineo is lecturer at Kent Law School, Canterbury.


Given the relative lack of media hype (with notable exceptions, see also here), readers may have missed the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s scathing report on the ‘left-to-die boat’ in the Mediterranean. On 27 March 2011, during the UN-authorized NATO military operations in Libya (see UNSCR 1973(2011)), a dinghy with 72 migrants (some of whom children) was making its way from Tripoli to Lampedusa when it run into difficulties for lack of fuel and food/water supplies. The ‘captain’ of the dinghy contacted a priest in Italy who swiftly alerted the Guardia Costiera (Coast Guard). The Italian authorities informed NATO of the coordinates of the ship in distress and sent repeated ‘ship in distress’ messages to all nearby vessels via satellite. An unidentified helicopter offered water and biscuits to the migrants and an unidentified warship passed very close nearby. Fishermen vessels also passed nearby. Spanish and Italian military vessels were apparently within easy reach. Yet no one rescued the migrants – and 63 of them died before the dinghy was brought by currents back to a city in Libya, after two weeks from their departure.


The United Nations estimates that at least 1,500 migrants died at sea in 2011 alone, but something is particularly harrowing about this case. The Italian government, the Spanish government, NATO (which had established a ‘maritime surveillance area’) and other countries knew the location of the dinghy, knew what the situation was, but omitted to intervene and effectively left 63 people to die of hunger and thirst in a portion of sea otherwise crowded with military and other ships (some of which precisely in charge of protecting the Libyan civilian population).


Among the many maritime borders and delimitations in the Mediterranean sea, one of the most important ones is the Search And Rescue (SAR) areas established under the International Maritime Search and Rescue Convention (1405 UNTS 118, as amended). Although this incident took place in the Libyan SAR, the Italian government, which had first received information about the distress, was probably under an obligation to coordinate a rescue operation. In fact, the Italian government today acknowledged its responsibility for the events. Minister Riccardi said that the government ‘accepts responsibility for this’, adding that these facts had ‘touched [him] very much’ and that they must provoke a rethinking of migration policies. The legal consequences of this acceptance of responsibility are important: Italy should now immediately proceed to compensate the survivors and the families of the victims for the suffering caused by Italy’s breach of its international obligations. Although commendable, ministerial apologies are certainly not enough.


 



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From the North Sea to the Bay of Bengal: Maritime Delimitation at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

From the North Sea to the Bay of Bengal: Maritime Delimitation at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Last week, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea delivered its judgment in the Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar). Although Bangladesh and Myanmar started negotiations for the delimitation of their maritime boundaries since 1974, when Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan, the boundary had still to be settled by 2009, when Bangladesh initiated the proceedings. The dispute was fuelled in 2008 when, following the discovery by Indian and Myanmar of gas deposits, Myanmar authorised exploration in the contested area. Bangladesh replied by sending its warships in the disputed area. Luckily, conflict was avoided following intense negotiations between the parties and the dispute has now been solved peacefully by having recourse to the dispute settlement provisions (Part XV) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

 The decision established the boundary of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf [including the area of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from the baselines], between the two States in the Bay of Bengal. It also addresses navigation in the territorial waters of Bangladesh by vessels of Myanmar and discusses the rights and duties of the parties in the area where the continental shelf of Bangladesh beyond 200 nm overlaps with the water column within 200 nm from the coast of Myanmar.

This case is the first to be decided between the two initiated by Bangladesh for the delimitation of its maritime boundaries with its neighbouring States, Myanmar and India. As Dapo has already reported, delimitation of the Bangladeshi-Indian boundary has been submitted to arbitration. It is to be expected that, following the decision on the boundary, Bangladesh and Myanmar will now start exploitation activities in the bay of Bengal.

For those familiar with maritime delimitation, a quick glance at the map of the region will bring immediately in mind the geography of the North Sea continental shelf cases, decided by the ICJ in 1969. There are indeed at least three similarities between the two cases. The first is the concavity of the coast of one State. In the North Sea case it was Germany, in this case it is Bangladesh. The second is the role of geology and the relevance of the concept of natural prolongation. The third is the necessity for the judge seized with the dispute to exercise “law-making” functions, absent any judicial precedent. In the North Sea case, the ICJ had to determine the rules for the delimitation of the continental shelf according to custom (since the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was not applicable), in the 2012 case ITLOS had to determine the method for delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Of course, the distance between the North Sea and the Bay of Bengal is not only geographical, since the lapse of more than 40 years has added much to the law of maritime delimitation. In 1969 there was no international decision on delimitation save the Grisbadarna award, and the rules and methods finally determined by the ICJ were developed against scant state practice. Nowadays, numerous decided cases provide a robust case law. More importantly, the merits of rules and methods used by courts have been tested several times in state practice. This practice, for example, has confirmed the significance of the equidistance/special circumstances rule and has generally rejected methods such as the corridor method employed in the St Pierre and Miquelon case (one of the very few cases not mentioned at all by the ITLOS).

There are many interesting bits in this decision, not only for the law of the sea scholar, but also for the international lawyer. One issue that is addressed, albeit rapidly, by the Tribunal concerns the elements necessary for the existence of a treaty (this is done in discussing the Agreed Minutes, paras. 88-99). Tacit agreement (paras. 100-118), and estoppel (119-125) are also briefly discussed. The commitment by Bangladesh to allow for the innocent passage of ships of Myanmar in its territorial waters around St Martin’s Island is an example of unilateral act of state producing legal consequences (paras. 175-176) although one could wonder for the need of it, in light if the legal regime provided by Part II UNCLOS. Unfortunately ITLOS did not expand on many issues of interest to the specialist in law of the sea or to international lawyers more generally (this has been commented upon by Judge Wolfrum in his separate opinion). The concise manner of dealing with of many points is probably due to the wish to take on board as many judges as possible. Notably, almost all judges voted in favour of the dispositive, including the two ad hoc judges. The latter not only voted in favour of each point in the dispositive, but also attached a joint declaration to the judgment. While this is unusual in international adjudication, it is in line with the purpose of delimitation, which does not consist in establishing whether a State has complied or not with international law, but aims at drawing a boundary that did not exist before.

 

ITLOS and the Case Law of Other Tribunals

As Dapo has already reported, this was the first time in which the Tribunal was called upon to draw a maritime boundary between two States. Maritime delimitation cases had so far been decided either by the ICJ or by arbitral tribunals and it was indeed feared by some judges and scholar that bringing a new court into this field would lead to fragmentation of the law. This first decision of ITLOS in this area suggests that these fears are unfounded.

The Tribunal was very keen to emphasise that it will respect previous case law (e.g. para. 184, para. 226 and para. 240) and most of the judges in their declarations or opinions also stressed this fact, sometimes openly acknowledging that this decision far from justifies threats of fragmentation proposed by some . For example, Judge Treves, in his declaration, stated that:

 

“all courts and tribunals called to decide on the interpretation and application of the Convention, including its provisions on delimitation, should … consider themselves as parts of a collective interpretative endeavour, in which, while keeping in mind the need to ensure consistency and coherence.”

 

Many elements in the decision reinforce this conclusion. These elements include the constant reference to previous case law (ITLOS cites almost all previous decisions in the field), the language used, the distinction between delimitation of the territorial sea and delimitation of the single boundary between exclusive economic zones and continental shelves (as in the ICJ Qatar/Bahrain decision and subsequent case law), the method of delimitation chosen (the three steps approach adopted by the ICJ in the more recent Romania/Ukraine case), the paramount role of geography in establishing the boundary line and the discharge of geology as a basis for the delimitation or even as a special circumstance. Among many other elements that may have strengthened this approach, there is certainly the experience in maritime boundary delimitation of some among the judges of the Tribunal. Just to make a few examples, Judges Treves, Wolfrum and Judge ad hoc Mensah are also members of the tribunal addressing the delimitation between Bangladesh and India; Judge Nelson was president of the tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname case; Judge Cot was or is ad hoc judge in the ICJ in the Romania/Ukraine case and the Nicaragua/Colombia case; Judge ad hoc Oxman has been an ad hoc Judge in the Romania/Ukraine case.

 

In addition to the great advantages of judicial consistency, transparency and predictability of the law, adherence to judicial precedents produces two drawbacks. The first is that the Tribunal also follows very much the general trend in endorsing some misunderstandings or equivocal solutions of its predecessors. Thus, for example, in delimiting the single boundary between the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves, ITLOS professes that it will start by a provisional equidistance line (para. 240). However, it then immediately proceeds to choose the base-point for this line, thus producing what in reality is a modified equidistance line. The second drawback is the absence of elaboration on some points, in the likely wish to avoid discussing critically previous decisions. One cannot help feeling that the absence of any discussion is probably due to the wish to accommodate as many views as possible and to achieve general endorsement of the final delimitation line, even if single judges may disagree on the method used for arriving at it. The effort of the Tribunal to achieve this aim is noteworthy (and praiseworthy) even though more elaboration would have been welcomed in clarifying the law and ensuring legal certainty and predictability.

The decision therefore does not significantly depart from the established law as developed by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals in their “law-making” capacity. The fact that there are no striking innovations does not however mean that the Tribunal does not participate on an equal standing to this process. Far from that, the Tribunal has taken care to add its little bit to the existing case law and to move it one step forward. The two most evident examples are the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and the regime applicable in the so-called “grey areas”. The Tribunal has also, more subtly, indicated what the law is with respect to another issue in maritime delimitation – that of the prevalence of one maritime zone on the other. The Tribunal clarifies that the territorial sea will prevail upon the exclusive economic zone (para. 169) and that a State may exercise rights in an area of overlap that do not impede the exercise of rights by the other State (as in the case of the exclusive economic zone water column overlapping the continental shelf). It has also shed light on the meaning of “agreement” in Art. 15 UNCLOS, on the basis for the entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm and on the relationship between the role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and that of the binding dispute settlement mechanism in Part XV UNCLOS.

 

While it is quite probable that the ICJ will remain as busy as ever with delimitation cases, it is also true that the first attempt of the ITLOS at delimiting a maritime boundary has been successful (not only Bangladesh, but also other States such as France and Japan have commented positively on the decision). States, scholars and other judges may rest assured: the ITLOS will follow the tradition and will not innovate any more than is necessary. It is therefore a valid alternative for the delimitation of maritime boundaries.

 

The Delimitation

The delimitation of the single maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar follows very much the trend in recent (i.e. since the 1993 Jan Mayen decision) delimitation cases. The ITLOS first divides the boundary line to be drawn into three segments: the first will delimit the territorial seas of the parties, the second their exclusive economic zones and their continental shelves up to 200 nm, and the third the continental shelves beyond 200 nm. The reasons for this differ. In the case of the territorial sea, the applicable rules is formally different from that applying for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. In the case of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the Tribunal has to first to address the contention by Myanmar that it does not have jurisdiction and that, even if it had, it should not exercise it. ITLOS then proceeds to delimit each segment on the basis of the applicable rules and principles. Finally, it evaluates the proportionality of the boundary thus reached in the light of the ratio between the relevant coasts of the two States and the ratio between the areas attributed to each.

The first task of the ITLOS was to delimit the territorial sea between the parties, since it decided that the Agreed Minutes adopted jointly by the heads of delegations during one of the negotiations rounds did not constitute a binding agreement, and that there was no tacit agreement or estoppels, in the light of the lack of consistent evidence. Delimitation was effected according to Art. 15 UNCLOS, which requires that an equidistance line be adopted, unless there are special circumstances or historic title justifying another line. The provisional equidistance line became the final boundary for this area, since according to ITLOS there are no special circumstances to justify departure from it. St Martin’s Island, part of Bangladesh, was afforded full effect and was used for plotting the equidistance line. This outcome is very much in line with previous decisions and with the established State practice, that has privileged equidistance in the delimitation of the territorial sea and has given full effect to islands.

The Tribunal rules out the possibility to have the exclusive economic zone of Myanmar prevail over the territorial sea generated by St Martin’s Island:

 

“the Tribunal recognizes that Bangladesh has the right to a 12 nm territorial sea around St. Martin’s Island in the area where such territorial sea no longer overlaps with Myanmar’s territorial sea. A conclusion to the contrary would result in giving more weight to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Myanmar in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf than to the sovereignty of Bangladesh over its territorial sea” (para. 169).

 

The second task concerned the delimitation of the single boundary for the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf within 200 nm. The applicable law, according to the Tribunal, is to be found in the UNCLOS (para. 182), customary international law (para. 183) and judicial decisions (para. 184). ITLOS adopts the three-step method used by the ICJ, according to which it first draws an equidistance line, it then checks its equitableness in the light of relevant circumstances and finally assesses the outcome on the basis of the proportionality criterion (para. 240). The provisional delimitation line is, in reality, already a modified equidistance, since ITLOS operates a selection of the basepoints to be used towards this task (para. 241). The Tribunal decided not to use St Martin’s Island as a basepoint, because of the alleged cut-off effect on the projection of Myanmar’s coast (265). Turning to relevant circumstances, the Tribunal accepts Bangladesh’s contention that its concave coast is relevant. According to the Tribunal, it is not concavity itself that is relevant, but it is rather the cut-off effect that a concave coast produces (para. 292). Accordingly, it decides to modify the provisional line, by drawing a geodetic line starting at an azimuth of 215° (para. 334) from a point on the provisional line close to the coast (para. 331). While in principle considered as a relevant circumstance for the purpose of the law on maritime delimitation (para. 318), ITLOS eventually does not attribute any effect to St Martin’s Island for practical reasons, because of the alleged cut-off effect it would produce (para. 318-319). Geology of the seabed, on the other hand, is considered irrelevant in law and in practice, because the delimitation of a single maritime boundary is to “be determined on the basis of geography” and not geology or geomorphology (para. 322). The final line, visible in Sketch-map no. 9 (p. 146 of the decision) is however better appreciated in the Illustration map 4 attached to the separate opinion of Judge Gao.

While the line thus drawn does appear to be somewhere in between the claims of the two parties and does not seem particularly inequitable for either, the very concise treatment of the issue of relevant circumstances by the ITLOS is rather surprising. Relevance of concavity is discussed in the light of previous case law, although the conclusion of the Tribunal on the point is very terse. Islands and geology are very hurriedly dismissed without any reference to precedents or any discussions of the reasons why this is done.

The third and final task of the Tribunal concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. This is the most innovative part of the decision. Despite the fact that some recent treaties have established boundaries beyond 200 nm, it was the first time that an international court or tribunal had to address the law and practice of delimiting such area. ITLOS has thus set the principles and rules not only for this case, but also for future use.

Firstly, it has made clear that a court or tribunal having jurisdiction on the basis of Part XV of the UNCLOS can delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nm even in the absence of recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (para. 363) and that there are no reasons to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction (para. 394). Secondly, the ITLOS defines that “natural prolongation” for the purposes of Art. 76 UNCLOS is very much the same as the continental margin, as defined in the same article (para. 434). Thus, only geomorphology (describing the seabed) and not geology (which describes the composition of the subsoil, i.e. under the seabed) is relevant in determining whether there is an overlapping of entitlements and thus the need to draw a boundary. This is essentially a rebuttal of natural prolongation as a geological concept. The Tribunal even arrives at the conclusion that a “significant geological discontinuity” is not relevant for determining entitlement (para. 438) and that the geographic origin of the sedimentary rocks is similarly irrelevant (para. 447). An interesting dictum confirms that entitlement to the continental shelf does not depend on any procedural requirements (para. 408) implicitly lending support to the opinion that submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is not a necessary prerequisite for claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nm (arguably, it is required to fix the outer limit). Thirdly, the method to be applied for the delimitation of this area is the same as for the single boundary: equidistance/special circumstances (para. 455). An interesting point with respect to relevant circumstances is that the Tribunal does not consider geology as a relevant circumstance and does not accept Bangladesh’s argument of “the most natural prolongation” (para. 460). The only relevant circumstance for ITLOS is the concavity of the coast (para. 461). This part of the delimitation is aptly completed by a reference to the so-called “grey area” issue. In this regard, the ITLOS authoritatively affirms that when, by reason of the employment of a delimitation method other than the equidistance line, the extended continental shelf of a State, as delimited by a boundary line, is beneath the exclusive economic zone of the other, the latter still exercises all its rights over the water column (474). In such situation, each state, in exercising its rights and obligations, is under an obligation to have due regard to the rights and obligations of the other (para. 475-476). This part of the judgement thus provides valuable guidance for future cases, with respect to entitlement, delimitation and management of overlapping rights. Discussion of the legal consequences of a “grey area”, an issue so far avoided by international judges, is particularly welcome and should have a strong influence in future litigation. The issue could come to the attention of the ICJ in the Peru/Chile delimitation (which will be heard by that Court in December), and it will be interesting to see what role will be attributed by the ICJ to the ITLOS decision.

In the concluding proportionality test, aptly defined in the decision “disproportionality test”, the Tribunal, after noting that mathematical precision is not required in carrying out this task (para. 477), wraps up the delimitation exercise stating that a ratio of 1:1.42 (length of coasts) to 1:1.54 (area attributed to each) is not significantly disproportionate.

 

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ICC Delivers Its First Judgment: The Lubanga Case and Classification of Conflicts in Situations of Occupation

ICC Delivers Its First Judgment: The Lubanga Case and Classification of Conflicts in Situations of Occupation


On Wednesday, the International Criminal Court delivered its first ever judgment. The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga Case delivered a judgment of over 600 pages by which it convicted Thomas Lubanga of the war crime of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities. It has taken nearly a decade for the Court to reach the point where it has finally completed a trial (though expect an appeal). That is quite a long time to get to this point and the course of this particular trial has, at times, been particularly unfortunate.


As I haven’t read the entire judgment I am not in a position  to provide comprehensive comments on it at this point. I really want to focus on two issues. The first issue is the length of the judgment. It is a shame that the ICC has followed the trend of other international criminal tribunals in issuing these excessively long decisions. I fail to see why the decisions of these tribunals need to be as long as they are. I would be grateful if someone can explain why the judgments are so long. Sure, these tribunals deal with complex cases. However, domestic courts, at least the ones that I’m familiar with, do not issue judgments anywhere near this length and they do deal with complex matters as well. I agree completely with Dov Jacobs point on his blog when he says:



The Lubanga Judgment, including the separate opinions is over 600 pages. For one accused, and essentially one count! One can only have nightmares at the thought of having to read the judgment in the Katanga and Chui case, with two accused and some 10 counts, or an hypothetical Bashir Judgment with its long list of charges… Something needs to be done about this judicial logorrhea. What is amazing is that I’ve heard some of the staff of these tribunals justify the length of judgments for reasons of pedagogy. Of course. It makes total sense that a layperson is more likely to read a 600 page judgment than a 200 page judgment…


The second, and main, issue I want to deal with is the way in which the Trial Chamber dealt with the classification of the armed conflict. Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC sets out different lists of war crimes depending on whether an armed conflict is international or non-international. In general, an international armed conflict is one that takes place between States. In addition, the law regarding international armed conflicts applies to the occupation by a State of the territory of another State. But how should conflicts which take place in occupied territory and which involve non-State group be classified? In the Lubanga case, the question was whether Uganda’s occupation of the Ituri region in the Democratic Republic of Congo was relevant to the classification of the conflicts involving Lubanga’s militia – a militia that was found not to be under the control of any of the State’s fighting in that area. Where one State is in occupation of the territory of another State, should that fact mean that an armed conflict that takes place in the occupied territory is classified as an international conflict, even if that conflict relates to hostilities against or between non-State groups? On this point, the Trial Chamber disagreed with the view that the Pre-Trial Chamber had taken at the confirmation of charges stage of this same case.


The crime of conscripting or enlisting child soldier, or using children to participate actively in hostilities is stated to be a crime, under Article 8, in both international and non-international armed conflicts. Therefore, the classification of the conflict in this case does not at first sight appear to be of great significance. Except that the formulation of the crime is slightly different for the two types of conflicts. For international armed conflicts, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) speaks of conscription into “the national armed forces”, whilst Art. 8(2)(3)(vi) which provides for the crime in non-international armed conflicts speaks of conscription into “armed forces or groups”. One question that would arise, if the conflict was classified as international is whether recruitment into an armed group that is not part of the regular armed forces of the State but which is controllled by, or acts on behalf of, the State is recruitment into the “national armed forces”. The majority of the Trial Chamber did not deal with this question and Judge Odio Benito, in her separate opinion, thought they ought to have done so.


At the confirmation of charges stage of the Lubanga case, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that there were substantial grounds to believe that the relevant conflict in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo was an international armed conflict in the period in which Uganda was an occupying power in that Ituri region and a non-international armed conflict thereafter. However, the Trial Chamber, in its recent decision, changed the classification of the conflict and held that the relevant conflict was non-international throughout. In its view, the relevant conflict was that between the militia controlled by Thomas Lubanga and other militias and this was not an international armed conflict. It held that:



563. Similarly, although there is evidence of direct intervention on the part of Uganda, this intervention would only have internationalised the conflict between the two states concerned (viz. the DRC and Uganda). Since the conflict to which the UPC/FPLC [Lubanga's militia] was a party was not “a difference arising between two states” but rather protracted violence carried out by multiple non-state armed groups, it remained a non-international conflict notwithstanding any concurrent international armed conflict between Uganda and the DRC.


564. As discussed above, there is evidence that during the relevant timeframe the UPDF [Ugandan armed forces] occupied certain areas of Bunia, such as the airport. However, it is unnecessary to analyse whether territory came under the authority of the Ugandan forces, thereby amounting to a military occupation, because the relevant conflict or conflicts concern the UPC and other armed groups


565. Focussing solely on the parties and the conflict relevant to the charges in this case, the Ugandan military occupation of Bunia airport does not change the legal nature of the conflict between the  UPC/FPLC, RCD-ML/APC and FRPI rebel groups since this conflict, as analysed above, did not result in two states opposing each other, whether directly or indirectly, during the time period relevant to the charges. In any event, the existence of a possible conflict that was “international in character” between the DRC and Uganda does not affect the legal characterisation of the UPC/FPLC’s concurrent noninternational armed conflict with the APC and FRPI militias, which formed part of the internal armed conflict between the rebel groups.


I agree with the conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber that a conflict between non-State groups who are not controlled by or act on behalf of States is a non-international armed conflict, even if it takes place in occupied territory. I also agree that to the extent that the relevant conflict is one between Lubanga’s militia and other armed groups, the conflict should be regarded as non-international law. However, I also think some of the statements made by the Chamber are overly broad. In particular, I think it is wrong to assume that in a situation of occupation, the law relating to international armed conflicts only applies to hostilities between State armed forces or forces controlled by them. In my view, the law of occupation (the law of international armed conflicts) also applies to the acts of the occupying power in its relationship with the people in the occupied territory. Thus the occupier is bound to observe the law relating to international armed conflicts where hostilities break out in occupied territory with non-State groups. I deal with this issue in my chapter in a book to be published by Oxford University Press later this year. The book is edited by Elizabeth Wilmshurst and is on International Law and the Classification of Conflicts .  As I say in that chapter:



The argument that armed conflicts between an occupying power and a non-state group within occupied territory amount to a non-international armed conflict proceeds from the view that every international armed conflict is between two opposing States. However, the relevant question is not what type of conflict exists between the State and the non-state group but what law applies to the acts of an occupying power within occupied territory. It is important to note that the law of occupation is not just about the relationship between two contending States and not just a means of indicating the temporary nature of the authority of the occupier vis-à-vis that of the territorial State. The law of occupation is also a means of regulating what may well be the tense relationship between the occupying power and persons within the occupied territory and a means of providing restraint with regard to how the occupier treats the local population. The tension between the occupier and the local population may well result in acts of hostilities but the fact that the local population has chosen to rise up in arms does not free the occupier from the restraints it otherwise has. Indeed it ought to strengthen those restraints. The law of occupation is no less necessary in those situations. Moreover, the law of occupation is cognizant of the fact that persons who are not combatants (in the sense in which that term is used in international armed conflicts) may well engage in hostilities against the occupier, acts of sabotage, or other acts which imperil the security of the occupier. For example, article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contemplates persons who engage in sabotage, the provisions relating to internment deal with persons who may imperil the security of the State. Likewise, article 45(3) of Additional Protocol I contemplates that persons who engage in hostilities in a situation of occupation, and are not entitled to prisoner of war status, are nevertheless entitled to the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention or of the fundamental guarantees in article 75 of Additional Protocol I (which represents customary law)


Thus, it is the law of occupation and other rules of international armed conflict (including the law of targeting) that conditions how the occupier may respond to an uprising in the foreign territory of which it has temporary occupation.


 In Lubanga, these issues are not particularly relevant as the conflict that was relevant was that between Lubanga’s militia and other armed groups. However, the Trial Chamber did note that for a period in March 2003 there was fighting between Ugandan forces and Lubanga’s group. This raises questions as whether that part of the conflict should have been seen as international. In so far as the conflict was one between the occupying State and an armed group, the consideration I set out above would suggest that the conflict should indeed be governed by the law of international armed conflicts. However, this appears to have been only a minor part of the conflict in Ituri involving Lubanga’s militia.



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Judging Judges: A Statistical Exercise

Judging Judges: A Statistical Exercise


Andrea Bianchi’s excellent, thoughtful post on the perceptions of certainty in response to the ICJ’s Germany v. Italy judgment provokes many questions. What, exactly, created the certainty both within the Court and outside it as to how the Court would decide the case? Is it the determinacy of the law, as the positivists among us would argue? Or is it the structural biases of the Court as an institution and of its individual judges that we were out of experience simply able to assess and predict, as would be the view of the more critically minded? But I was particularly struck by Professor Bianchi’s praise of Judge Cancado Trindade, who found himself in the smallest of minorities, dissenting alone on the jus cogens not overriding immunity point:



Finally, a word of praise for Judge Cançado Trinidade (who issued a dissenting opinion in this case) is in order. His lengthy opinions and his weltanschauung are often looked down on or frowned at. In fact, Judge Cançado is long engaged in an attempt to acculturate the international judicial bodies in which he [sits] and, more generally, the epistemic community of international lawyers. Suffice to cast a glance to the background, academic and/or judicial record of his fellow judges to realize how on certain fundamental issues at the ICJ he does not even belong to a minority: he is almost completely isolated. I trust he has realized by now that The Hague is a much colder place than San José. Yet his function remains fundamental. One could paraphrase Voltaire and say that ‘If Cançado did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him’. Not so much for me or for any other more or less established member of the profession, but for all those students who approach the study of international law and want to believe in the redeeming force of human rights and universal justice for a better world. Here is another hand. Of this, I am quite certain.


One could take issue with some of Bianchi’s points. Today’s ICJ is perhaps not as devoid of human rights-minded judges as it once was. And while challenging orthodoxy is a good thing, a judge who allows himself to become isolated within his court is perhaps not pursuing the wisest or the most effective course of action, even assuming the general validity of his own worldview. But I am really interested here in a broader and more fundamental point: how exactly should we measure the effectiveness of a judge, particularly a judge on the ICJ? If legal argument generally and judging specifically is an exercise in persuasion, what is the audience that the judge should seek to persuade and in what manner? Is the judge to be the harbinger of utopia, writing for those who “want to believe in the redeeming force of human rights and universal justice for a better world,” or a realistic, pragmatic apologist of the world as it stands today? Your mileage, I imagine, may vary.


These broader questions aside, perhaps it would be useful – or at least interesting – to evaluate the performance so far of Judge Cancado Trindade, now sitting on the ICJ for some three years. I wish to do so through a rather trivial statistical exercise, and leave it up to the readers to draw their own conclusions, if any. The table below was compiled by an excellent LL.M student of mine at Nottingham, Tilman Dralle, to whom I’m grateful for his assistance. The table is I think fairly self-explanatory:


 























































































































Decision of the Court


Size of majority on all claims


Judge CT in the majority?


Page length of the decision v. length of CT’s separate opinion, if CT is writing separately


How many other judges write separately in addition to CT?


Combined page length of all other judges’ sep. op. v. length of CT’s op.

Germany v. Italy, Judgment of 3 February 2012 12:3, 14:1 No 54:88 5 41:88
Germany v. Italy, Order of 4 July 2011 (Application by the Hellenic Republic for Permission to Intervene) 15:1 Yes 12:21 1 1:21
Germany v. Italy, Order of 6 July 2010 13:1 No 12:50 3 6:50
Judgment No.2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2012 Unanimously Yes 40:33 1 3:33
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011 14:2, 15:1 Yes 52: none 5 43: none
Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011 (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) 11:5, 15:1 Yes 22:33 7 25:33
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 4 May 2011 (Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene)  9:7 No 29:10 (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges CT and Yusuf) 6 (including Yusuf) 25:10 (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges CT and Yusuf)
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 4 May 2011 (Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene) 13:2 Yes 28:4 (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges CT and Yusuf) 5 (including Yusuf) 32:4 (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges CT and Yusuf)
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Judgment of 1 April 2011 (Preliminary objections) 12:4, 10:6 Yes, No 69:65 9 93:65
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order of 8 March 2011 13:4 Yes 23: none 7 31: none
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment of 30 November 2010 8:6, 13:1, 12:2, 9:5 No, Yes, No, No 53:63 8 56:63
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 9:5, 10:4 Yes 45:71 8 61:71
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010 13:1, 11:3 Yes 85:58 8 79:58
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009 9:5, 13:1, 12:2 Yes 63: none 3 30: none
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009 (Request for the indication of provisional measures) 13:1 No 21:36 5 16:36

 


To crunch some of these numbers a bit, in the past three years since Judge CT’s appointment, the Court delivered 15 substantive decisions, shown in the table above (excluding completely routine orders, e.g. on the setting of time limits for the filing of written pleadings).  In those 15 decisions, Judge CT was in the majority  some  42% of the time, depending on how exactly you count the vote on each point of the dispositif. Judge CT wrote a separate or dissenting opinion in all but 3 of those cases, i.e. 80% of the time. The combined length of all of these decisions of the Court is 608 pages (counting one official language only), while Judge CT separately wrote a total of 532 pages. If we were to exclude from this tally the 3 decisions in which CT did not write separately and the 2 decisions in which he wrote jointly with Judge Yusuf, when doing an individual opinion Judge CT writes 1.25 pages for every page written by the Court (518/413), on average writing 51.8 pages per opinion (518/10). In all of the 15 decisions, the other judges (and judges ad hoc) combined wrote 542 pages of separate opinions, dissents or declarations, on average writing about 6 pages per opinion (542/89), while Judge CT wrote a total of 532 pages. In other words, Judge CT’s output in terms of his individual opinions over the past three years is practically equal to that of all of the other judges and judges ad hoc of the Court combined. No mean feat that.


Again, I leave it up to the readers to draw their own conclusions. My own impression, for what it’s worth, is that Judge CT’s perceived isolation from his colleagues is less due to the substance of his arguments and more due to their style and manner. The problem is not necessarily in his human rightist, judicial activist, utopian worldview (if I have to resort to such unfortunately simplistic labels), or in the supposed ideological inability of the other (‘statist’, conservative, apologist) judges to process the arguments coming out of this worldview, but more in the way in which these arguments are presented. I doubt his current colleagues think it is particularly useful for him to write a 50-page separate opinion in 4 out of 5 cases, totaling more than 500 pages in the ICJ Reports over the past three years (and printed at public expense, mind you), and I equally doubt his former colleagues in more temperate San Jose thought it particularly helpful to read separate opinions that, for example, engaged in extensive comparisons between the real and present victims of  human rights violations to Sophocles’ Antigone and Electra.


I have little doubt, on the other hand, that Judge CT’s fellow judges have long since stopped reading his opinions, and this is a problem for any judge who seeks to persuade his colleagues. Nor do I think that his opinions are really much more widely read in the academia, least of all by students. Coming back now to the broader questions, while different judges can certainly have different styles and indeed see their own role in different ways, what in my view ultimately makes a great judge is primarily his or her connection to the Court on which he or she sits. Not the heftiness of his or her footprint in the ICJ Reports, not the uncompromising ‘progressiveness’ of his or her views, but the ability to think strategically, persuade colleagues, build coalitions and majorities, produce tangible results and outcomes within the Court, and lay firm foundations for future developments even when in the minority. Of this, I am quite certain.



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Argentina’s Position on Different Aspects of the Question of the Malvinas Islands

Argentina’s Position on Different Aspects of the Question of the Malvinas Islands

History

The Malvinas Islands became part of an area under Spanish jurisdiction with the entry into force of the first international instruments to delimit the “New World” soon after the discovery of the Americas in 1492. The Papal Bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 were the first instruments that conferred titles on Spain in accordance with the international law of the time.

Since the early 16th century and for most of it, only navigators at the service of Spain travelled the maritime routes along the South American coast, advancing southwards in their search for an inter-oceanic passage. In this process, the Malvinas Islands were discovered by members of Magellan’s expedition in the year 1520. From then on they were recorded on European maps under a variety of names and remained as part of the spaces under effective control of the Spanish authorities.

During the 17th century, the Malvinas Islands were sighted by navigators from other nations who had ventured into Spanish domains at the risk of provoking reactions and protests from Spain whenever it received news of such expeditions. But the whole southern region of the Americas, with its coasts, seas and islands, was indisputably preserved under Spanish sovereignty through the different treaties signed in that period, such as the “American “ Treaty of 1670 between Spain and England.

The Peace of Utrecht, signed in 1713, assured the integrity of Spain’s possessions in South America and confirmed its exclusive right to sail in the waters of the South Atlantic. As a signatory of the Utrecht agreements, and of later 18th century treaties ratifying it, England accepted these clauses. However, towards the middle of that century, the Malvinas Islands provoked the interest of Great Britain and France, which were seeking to establish a strategically located settlement opposite the Magellan Strait.

In 1749, Spain received news of a British project to settle in the Malvinas Islands, and strongly protested to the Government of the United Kingdom, which as a consequence, gave up on it.

When in 1764 France established Port Louis on Soledad Island, Spain objected and won the recognition of its right to the islands from France. The French Government ordered the evacuation and handover of the settlement to the Spanish authorities. The handover was made in 1767 and, from then on, there was always a Spanish governor residing in the Malvinas Islands who reported to the authorities of Buenos Aires.

The year after the French settlement, a clandestine British expedition arrived in the archipelago and later, in 1766, English sailors established a fort at a place they named Port Egmont, on an island to the west of Gran Malvina. Despite the secrecy of the Government of the United Kingdom, Spain became aware of this and repeatedly protested by invoking its rights. As it did not receive any acceptable response, it set out to find the illegal settlement, and, in 1770, expelled its settlers by force. As a result of that act, both countries were on the verge of war, which was averted by a bilateral agreement signed in 1771. This agreement consisted of a Declaration by which Spain returned Port Egmont to the British in order to save the honour of the King of England, making express reservation of its sovereignty over the whole of the Malvinas Islands, and an Acceptance of the Declaration in which Great Britain remained silent as to the reservation of Spanish rights. As part of the agreement, it was verbally agreed that the English would withdraw from Port Egmont, which they did in 1774. From then on, the Spanish authorities in Puerto Soledad continued to exercise their jurisdiction and control over the whole archipelago.

In 1790, with the signing of the Treaty of San Lorenzo del Escorial, Great Britain undertook not to establish any settlements on either the eastern or the western coasts of South America or on the adjacent islands already occupied by Spain, which was the case with the Malvinas Islands.

Spain appointed a succession of thirty-two governors in the Malvinas Islands up until 1811, when the garrison at Puerto Soledad was required from Montevideo to defend the monarchy at the beginning of the War of Independence. The first autonomous governments of the United Provinces of the River Plate referred to the Malvinas Islands in various administrative acts, considering them an integral part of their territory, inherited from Spain by succession of States under the uti possidetis juris principleof 1810.

In 1820, amongst the difficult circumstances imposed by the internal struggles faced by the Argentine state in formation, Naval officer David Jewett took possession of the Malvinas Islands on behalf of the United Provinces of the River Plate at a public ceremony in Puerto Soledad, which was attended by sealers and whalers of different nationalities, including Americans and British, who had happened to disembark on the islands in the course of their work. The news was published in the media in the United States and the United Kingdom but there was no official comment from either of the two countries, nor did Great Britain stake any claim to the Malvinas Islands in the process of recognition of the Argentine State, which ended with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation in 1825.

During the 1820s, successive Argentine Governments took various actions in support of their sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, including the appointment of governors, legislation on fishing resources and the granting of territorial concessions. As a result, Puerto Soledad grew and its inhabitants worked in stockbreeding, sealing and providing services to the boats which came into port.

On 10 June 1829, the Argentine Government enacted a decree creating the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas Islands. After having remained silent for over 50 years, in the course of which there had been successive uncontested Spanish and Argentine administrations in the Malvinas Islands, in November 1829 the United Kingdom objected to that decree against the backdrop of renewed strategic interest in the South Atlantic.

At the end of 1831, a United States warship razed Puerto Soledad as reprisal for the capture by the Argentine authorities of sealing vessels found to be infringing fishing laws. The Argentine Government immediately began attempts to obtain reparations from the United States and at the same time sent a navy schooner to restore order in the islands, upset by the arrival of the American vessel.

Once order had been restored in Puerto Soledad, a British Royal Navy corvette, with the support of another warship in the vicinity, threatened to use greater force and demanded the surrender and handover of the settlement. After the expulsion of the Argentine authorities, the commander of the British ship left one of the settlers of Puerto Soledad in charge of the flag and sailed back to his base. In 1834, the British Government assigned a Navy officer to remain in the islands, and only in 1841 did it decide to “colonize” the Malvinas Islands by appointing a “governor”.

The act of force of 1833, carried out in peacetime without prior communication or declaration by a government friendly to the Argentine Republic, was immediately rejected and protested. On 16 January 1833, the Argentine Government demanded explanations from the British Chargé d’Affaires, who was unaware of the actions carried out by the vessels of his country. On 22 January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a protest to the British government official, which was renewed and extended on several occasions by the Argentine representative in London. The Argentine presentations were rejected by the British Government.

The issue remained unsettled and this was recognised by the British Foreign Secretary in 1849. Argentina, meanwhile, continued to raise the issue at different levels of government and it became a subject of debate in the Argentine Congress. In 1884, in view of the lack of response to the repeated protests, Argentina proposed to take the issue to international arbitration, which was also rejected by the United Kingdom without any reasons being provided.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the successive Argentine governments made it standard practice to submit protests to the United Kingdom and to make submissions and reservations before the competent multilateral bodies whenever they had notice of unilateral British acts by which Argentina’s sovereignty was ignored. This was also the period during which the dispute extended to other South Atlantic and Antarctic island territories in respect of which Argentina, the United Kingdom and in some cases third countries began to carry out different activities. In 1908 Britain annexed such territories (the South Georgias, South Orkneys, South Shetland and South Sandwich Islands, as well as the Antarctic territory called Graham Land by the British) as “dependencies of the colony” of the Malvinas Islands. Argentina repeatedly extended its protests to such territories. Upon the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, in 1960, the sovereignty dispute over the South Orkneys, South Shetlands and the related part of the Antarctic territory remained subject to Article 4 of the Treaty. The other territories, i.e. the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, are still within the geographical space that, in addition to the Malvinas Islands, is the subject of the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom known as the “Malvinas Islands Question”.

Period 1945-1965

The so-called “Malvinas Islands Question”, meaning the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime spaces, was not only present in the United Nations Organization since its work began, but also emerged even during the process that led to its creation, when, at the end of World War II, the San Francisco Conference on International Organization was held.

There, in May 1945, upon debating the functions that the General Assembly of the Organization about to be created would have, Committee 4 of Commission II discussed the issue of the non-autonomous territories and the trust system to which they would be subject. In order to prevent its application from extending to the territories in respect of which Argentina claimed rights and which were under a sovereignty dispute, the Argentine Delegation made a reservation of rights, reflected in the rapporteur’s Report, indicating that the Republic would under no circumstances agree to this system being “applied to territories belonging to Argentina, whether they be subject to a claim or dispute or in the possession of other States”.

The following year, during the first session period of the Assembly General, the administrating Powers presented a list of non-autonomous territories that would be included within Chapter XI of the Charter, which in Article 73 e) establishes the obligation of such Powers to convey to the Secretary General information on them. The United Kingdom entered the Malvinas Islands on the list, on the basis of which the General Assembly prepared Resolution 66(I), adopted on 14 December 1946. As the Malvinas were referred to in this Resolution, the Argentine Delegation once again made a new reservation of its sovereignty rights, and continued to maintain this position whenever the Fourth Commission of the General Assembly examined the information conveyed by the United Kingdom on such territory.

Upon the matter being dealt with in the second session of the General Assembly, the Argentine Delegation reiterated its reservation, stating that the information conveyed by the Government of the Untied Kingdom with regard to the Malvinas Islands pursuant to Article 73 did not diminish or impair the title of the Argentine Republic to such islands and that Argentina did not recognize any acts carried out by other Powers in the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, the other Antarctic islands or the continental polar land within the Argentine Antarctic Sector.

In 1955, the Argentine Republic reasserted it’s rights and denied those alleged by the United Kingdom, when the latter stated its readiness to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in respect of what it called the “Malvinas Islands dependencies”. In replying to the statements made by the British delegate to the Fourth Commission with regard to acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by the United Kingdom, the Argentine Delegation answered that no such dependency relationship existed and stressed that even if it did exist, it could not be invoked by the United Kingdom because the Malvinas Islands were Argentine.

On 14 December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 (XV) “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples”, which established “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”, enshrining two fundamental principles which were to guide the decolonisation process: self-determination and territorial integrity. This Resolution provides, in its sixth paragraph, that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. This limitation imposed upon the right to self-determination means that the latter yields to respect for the territorial integrity of States.

During this stage of the consideration of the Malvinas Islands Question in the UN, which began in 1945 and continued until the mid-1960s, the constant feature were the assertions and reservations of Argentine rights. The inclusion of the matter in the decolonisation process ushered in a new phase. In March 1964, the Secretariat prepared a working document that was submitted to the Special Committee on Decolonisation, containing information on the territories to which Resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable. The Argentine Mission to the United Nations reacted to the inclusion of the Malvinas Islands in the said document, drawing attention to the omission of historical data and legal aspects, which “dims the rights of the Argentine Republic”, and by asking to take part in the debates of Subcommittee III, dealing with small territories, when it examines the situation of the islands.

Despite British opposition, Argentina was able to participate in the debate of Subcommittee III of the Special Committee. In September 1964, the Argentine Delegate, José María Ruda, presented a Statement setting out the historical and legal foundations of the Argentine sovereignty claim.

The “Ruda Statement” became a milestone in the development of the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, as it was the first structured presentation of the matter to the United Nations, which took note of its existence and recommended that the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom initiate bilateral negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution.

Following the successive recommendations of Subcommittee III and of the Special Committee, on 16 December 1965 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX), in which:

“Noting the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,

Invites the Governments of Argentina and Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee (…) with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Malvinas Islands”.

This invitation of the United Nations for Argentina and the United Kingdom to carry out negotiations on sovereignty, taking into account the interests of the population of the Malvinas Islands, was subsequently renewed by other Resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, as will be seen later. Thus, by recognizing the existence of a sovereignty dispute in respect of the Malvinas Islands and specifying its bilateral nature between Argentina and the United Kingdom and by establishing that it is to be settled by peaceful negotiation between the parties, expressly referring to the interests –and not the wishes- of the islanders, the international community excludes the application of the principle of self-determination.

This is because the specificity of the Question of the Malvinas Islands lies in the fact that the United Kingdom occupied the islands by force in 1833, expelled the people that had settled there and did not allow their return, thus violating the territorial integrity of Argentina. Therefore, the possibility of applying the principle of self-determination is ruled out, as its exercise by the inhabitants of the islands would cause the “disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity” of Argentina.

Period 1966-1982

In the context of the United Nations decolonization process and following the adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 stating that the dispute between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the Islands must be resolved through negotiations in accordance with the provisions and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), and the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands- a bilateral negotiation process was initiated during which several ways of resolving the dispute were discussed, without the parties reaching an agreement.

After the Argentine action initiated in 1964 within the United Nations framework, the Argentine government formally invited the government of the United Kingdom to start the negotiations recommended by the international community in order to settle the sovereignty dispute. The British government changed its position and for the first time agreed to conduct bilateral negotiations. These got their first boost through the respective Foreign Ministers, who met in Buenos Aires in early 1966. Hence, the visit of Michael Stewart in January 1966, the first visit to Argentina by a British Foreign Secretary, enabled initial contacts at ministerial level on the Malvinas Islands question, which was included on the agenda of the meetings with Foreign Minister Zavala Ortiz in order to enter into negotiations.

As a result of this exchange, both Ministers agreed that discussions recommended by this resolution should be pursued without delay through diplomatic channels, or such other means as may be decided with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem and to prevent this question affecting the excellent relations existing between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Ministers decided to transmit this decision to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The first round of negotiations was held in July 1966 in London and was described as highly positive by the Argentine Foreign Ministry, as the British Delegation had left no room for doubt as to the United Kingdom’s readiness to negotiate without imposing preconditions. That was the first time since 1833 that Great Britain had sat at the negotiating table and had shown a favourable predisposition to solving the dispute. From this early stage of the negotiation process, Argentina claimed restitution of sovereignty of the disputed territories, undertaking to respect the interests and way of life of the islanders in keeping with the mandate of Resolution 2065 (XX).

A second round took place, also in London, between November and December of the same year, on which occasion the British side proposed advancing towards improving communications between the islands and the Argentine continental territory, with a view to a future agreement on sovereignty. For the first time, the Untied Kingdom stated its willingness to agree to a “transfer of sovereignty”.

During the course of 1967 a phase of permanent informal talks began, which made it possible to keep the pace of negotiation without being limited to formal rounds. This stage saw the emergence of the first draft agreements seeking a solution to the dispute, dealing with the issues of sovereignty and communications. In September of that year, the Foreign Ministers of both countries met in New York while they were both attending the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly, a practice which would be repeated on several occasions during subsequent years. On the basis of these talks, diplomats from both countries advanced towards the drafting of a document that would reflect the degree of agreement reached. Following a proposal by the British party, this document took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, the text of which was agreed upon by both negotiating teams in August 1968, in order to then be submitted to the respective governments for final approval.

Among its main points, the Memorandum of Understanding stated that “the common objective is to settle definitively and in an amicable manner the dispute over sovereignty, taking duly into account the interests of the population of the Islands” and that “the two Governments intend to make early progress with practical measures to promote freedom of communication and movement between the mainland and the Islands”.

The Argentine government approved the text agreed upon at the negotiating table and advised the United Kingdom that it was ready to sign it, awaiting the decision of the British government to sign. The Secretaries of State responsible for the matter in the British Cabinet also approved the negotiated text. Then, when there were definite expectations of the Memorandum of Understanding being signed, leaks concerning the negotiation in the British press and their repercussions on domestic politics led the Cabinet to delay its final decision. This gave rise to opposition to the agreement in the British Parliament and media, which ultimately made the United Kingdom abandon the project in late 1968.

This virtually led to an interruption of the negotiations on sovereignty as from 1969. A new approach was then sought, focused on reaching an understanding on practical measures relating to communications while at the same time making a mutual reservation concerning the positions on sovereignty. These “special talks” took place throughout 1970 and their concrete outcome was the Joint Statement concerning communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland of July 1   1971, agreed in Buenos Aires through an exchange of reversal notes, under a formula that preserved the positions of each party with regard to sovereignty .

The 1971 agreement included a number of practical measures, which both governments began to implement as from that time in order to facilitate the movement of persons and goods between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands in both directions, in order to promote the establishment of cultural, social and economic links. The agreements reached were communicated to the United Nations Secretary General, indicating that the measures adopted by both governments took into account the interests of the population of the Malvinas Islands, pursuant to Resolution 2065(XX), and that they were aimed at contributing to the efforts which both would continue to make in order to reach an amicable final settlement of the sovereignty dispute. These agreements represented a stage in the process towards the final settlement of the dispute.

In order to implement the measures agreed in 1971, regular consultations were held within the framework of a Special Consultative Commission set up in Buenos Aires, while a team of the Argentine Air Force built a provisional airfield in the vicinity of the capital of the Malvinas Islands and the company Líneas Aéreas del Estado provided air services between the Islands and the Argentine mainland. In conjunction with the inauguration of the air field built by Argentina, in November 1972, a new round of special talks on communications was held in the Malvinas Islands, which dealt with matters such as the awarding of scholarships to the islanders for them to study in the mainland, sending Spanish teachers to the islands, the establishment of postal, telegraphic and telephone, tourism, sponsored visits and cultural exchanges, increasing trade exchanges and the banking system, among other matters.

The Argentine Republic made a great effort to facilitate communications with the Malvinas Islands, which was recognized by the United Kingdom and which the islanders took advantage of in order to lessen their isolation. But in spite of dealing with the establishment of communications, the Argentine government did not leave aside its main objective in the negotiations, i.e. recovering the exercise of sovereignty. This is what it had stated and reiterated during the course of the special talks and, in view of the progress achieved by late 1972, it insisted that the next round should include the issue of sovereignty. When faced with this request, the British government adopted an evasive attitude, which continued during the meetings held in 1973.

In light of this negative British attitude, the Argentine Republic undertook intensive diplomatic action at multilateral level, which led to the adoption of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) in December 1973, with a very large majority of votes for and none against, and which acknowledged “the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina” and declared the “need to accelerate the negotiations […] called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Based on the firm Argentine attitude and the view of a large majority of the international community, in the years that followed both governments attempted some alternatives to get the negotiation back on track. This was the case with the British proposal of June 1974 seeking to establish an Anglo-Argentine condominium in the Malvinas Islands as a step prior to a final solution to the sovereignty dispute. This idea was met with interest on the part of the Argentine government, which then presented a proposal for joint administration, taking the main elements of the British formula and completing it with others that had not been considered in it. Although it was initially considered that both proposals were sufficiently close to each other so as to enable the negotiations to continue, they did not prosper.

Nevertheless, the Argentine government continued to maintain its commitments arising from the special talks and the agreements on communications. Within this framework, in September 1974 the two reversal note agreements that were being discussed were finalized, one on the supply and sale of Yacimientos Petrolìferos Fiscales (YPF, at the time the state owned petroleum company) products on the Malvinas Islands and another one on measures to facilitate trade and the transport of goods between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland, both of them without prejudice to the respective positions on sovereignty.

At the same time, the Argentine Republic continued trying to persuade the United Kingdom to agree to negotiate in order to find a definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute. An idea that arose during 1975 was the possibility of a condominium or shared administration. Although this idea circulated in British official circles and was considered with interest by the Argentine government, it did not prosper at the negotiating table.

In 1976 a situation of bilateral tension was reached, stemming from a number of unilateral British actions in the disputed area. At the end of that year, the United Nations General Assembly, by a wide majority and with the single opposition by the United Kingdom, adopted Resolution 31/49 (XXXI), which again recognized the “continuous efforts” made by the Government of Argentina to “facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands”, requesting both governments “to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in general Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII)” and urging both parties to “refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through a process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions”.

In order to resume dialogue, informal and exploratory meetings were held, during the course of which the United Kingdom proposed two parallel lines of negotiation, one on economic cooperation and another on the “hypothetical future constitutional relationship between the Malvinas Islands and Argentina”, within which the issue of sovereignty could be raised. Based on these premises, in April 1977 the reference framework for the future formal rounds was fixed through a joint statement expressing that they would refer to “future political relations including sovereignty with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the economic cooperation with regard to the said territories, in particular; and the South West Atlantic, in general.”

Argentina attended the rounds that followed with concrete initiatives, such as updating the joint administration arrangement, a reference list to discuss the safeguards and guarantees which the Argentine government was willing to offer to the islanders and a proposal to agree on a regime that would allow Argentines to purchase property on the islands. All of them stumbled upon hindrances on the British side, which only expressed interest in negotiating a cooperation agreement that would enable exploitation of natural resources in the disputed area. Two working groups were set up, one on sovereignty and another one on cooperation, but towards late 1978 the only discussion that seemed to have a chance to advance was the one on scientific cooperation. However, the draft agreement on this area could not be approved either.

In 1980, the British party proposed a change of approach consisting of secret exploratory talks based on a “transfer” of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands to Argentina simultaneously with a lease from Argentina to the United Kingdom for an extended period of time. These talks took place during the course of that year and the Argentine government showed interest in carrying on in particular the discussion with regard to the term of the lease. However, the negotiations did not succeed. Through informal contacts, only the bilateral dialogue was kept alive in order to agree on the reference framework for a new round which never materialized.

In early 1982, the Argentine government proposed a new approach, based on the establishment of a permanent negotiation commission that would meet every month for a year in order to solve the sovereignty dispute. In February of that year, a meeting took place in New York to consider that proposal. Although the joint statement reaffirmed the willingness of both parties to find a negotiated solution to the sovereignty dispute, the United Kingdom gave no answer to the Argentine proposal. In view of the contradictory signals from the British government, in early March the Argentine government decided to issue a statement disclosing the nature of the negotiations and urging the United Kingdom to accept the latest Argentine proposal. Those were the circumstances surrounding the events that led to the armed conflict; sovereignty negotiations not to resume, a situation which has continued until now due to the British refusal.

“a) Since divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution to the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, nothing contained in the Joint Statement referred to above and approved by our two Governments on today’s date shall be interpreted as: (i) a renunciation by either Government of any right of territorial sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands; or (ii) a recognition of or support for the other Government’s position with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. (b) No acts or activities taking place as a consequence of the Joint Statement referred to above having been put into operation and while it is in operation shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying the position of either Government with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.” (Notes exchanged between Luis María de Pablo Pardo, Argentine Foreign Minister, and Theophilus Peters, British Charge d’Affaires, 5 August 1971).

1 -“a) Since divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution to the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, nothing contained in the Joint Statement referred to above and approved by our two Governments on today’s date shall be interpreted as: (i) a renunciation by either Government of any right of territorial sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands; or (ii) a recognition of or support for the other Government’s position with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. (b) No acts or activities taking place as a consequence of the Joint Statement referred to above having been put into operation and while it is in operation shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying the position of either Government with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.” (Notes exchanged between Luis María de Pablo Pardo, Argentine Foreign Minister, and Theophilus Peters, British Charge d’Affaires, 5 August 1971).

Period 1982-1989

The 1982 conflict did not alter the nature of the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime spaces, which continued pending negotiation and resolution. During the General Assembly session initiated in September 1982, Resolution 37/9 was adopted, which, recalling Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), asked Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in order to find, as soon as possible, a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, reaffirming the need for both governments to take into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands. This Resolution received 90 votes in favour, 52 abstentions and 12 votes against, among them that of the United Kingdom.

Following that Resolution and upon the reestablishment of democracy in 1983, the Argentine Republic resumed its peaceful sovereignty claim and repeatedly stated its willingness to resume negotiations pursuant to the UN mandate, which was renewed in similar terms. That year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 38/12, in which it reiterated the terms of Resolution 37/9 and regretted the lack of progress in complying with it, highlighting the interest of the international community in Argentina and the United Kingdom resuming negotiations.

In 1984, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 39/6, in which it recalled the previous ones related to the Malvinas Question and noted “that, in spite of the time which has elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX), the prolonged dispute has not yet been resolved”. In 1985, through Resolution 40/21, the Assembly again urged the parties to settle the pending dispute through negotiations, rejecting the two amendment proposals through which the United Kingdom sought to introduce, in the preambular section and in the operative section the principle of self-determination, the inapplicability of which in the Malvinas Question was thus ratified. This Resolution was adopted by a wide majority of 107 votes in favour, 41 abstentions and only 4 against, Great Britain among the later. In the following years the Assembly adopted similar Resolutions: 41/40 in 1986, 42/19 in 1987 and 43/25 in 1988. Subsequently, the Special Committee on Decolonisation, with the corresponding approval by the General Assembly, has annually adopted Resolutions on the Malvinas Islands Question, in which the parties are again urged to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute.

Despite this consistent view supported by the international community through the Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee after the conflict, the United Kingdom continues to refuse to resume sovereignty negotiations with the Argentine Republic, which were interrupted in February 1982. Whereas before the conflict the matter was on the negotiating table, immediately after the war the British attitude was to claim that the sovereignty dispute had ceased. Later on, the British stance changed and at present, ignoring the bilateral nature of the sovereignty dispute and invoking self-determination –inapplicable to this case and repeatedly rejected by the Untied Nations for this question- refuses to negotiate a solution to the dispute, subjecting it to the decision of its nationals in the islands.

The interests of the inhabitants and not their wishes must be taken into account, as indicated by the United Nations in the different documents relating to the Malvinas Islands . This is so because the UN has taken the view that a population transplanted by the colonial Power, as is currently the case in the Malvinas Islands, is not a people with the right to free determination, as it is not different from the people of the metropolis. The British nature of this population has been recognized by the United Kingdom and since 1983 its members have the status of British citizens, in accordance with the British Nationality Act passed that year. If, in the case of the Malvinas Islands, self-determination were to be admitted in respect of the current inhabitants, of British character and nationality, this would be tantamount to allowing a group of persons from the colonial Power itself to decide on the destiny of a territory that is being claimed by another State which had that territory taken away from it by force nearly two hundred years ago.

Period 1989-2011

Consular relations resumed following the Joint Statement of 19 October 1989 and diplomatic relations resumed following the Joint Statement of 15 February 1990.

The policy of reconstruction of bilateral relations between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom which began in 1989 was preceded by an understanding on the conditions under which both countries would consider the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.

For such purpose, through the Joint Declarations of Madrid of 1989 and 1990, a sovereignty safeguard formula was agreed upon with respect to the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which allowed the Parties to adopt provisional understandings in subsequent joint declarations and note exchanges regarding practical issues relating to the South Atlantic, while reserving their respective positions on the sovereignty rights over those territories. This clause has been applied at all the bilateral meetings held since 1989 on practical aspects of the Question of the Malvinas Islands, as well as to declarations and acts by the parties and third parties that have taken place pursuant to the agreements reached at the meetings. The use of the abovementioned formula implies that both parties recognize the existence of a sovereignty dispute regarding the Question of the Malvinas Islands. Furthermore, the interim understandings adopted on practical aspects of the dispute seek to contribute to create enabling conditions for the resumption of sovereignty negotiations.

However, the question of sovereignty, the issue that is central to the dispute, has not yet been addressed due to the United Kingdom’s reluctance to include the topic in the negotiations, despite the multiple appeals of the international community to a definitive solution.

Since the 1994 reform, the National Constitution includes the First Transitory Provision, which provides that: “Argentina reaffirms its legitimate and permanent sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the relevant maritime and insular areas, as they are an integral part of the Argentine territory. The regaining of those territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, with respect for the lifestyle of their inhabitants and in accordance with the principles of International Law, are a permanent and unrelinquished objective of the Argentine people.”

The Argentine Government has implemented a State policy as regards the Question of the Malvinas Islands, which promotes the resumption of sovereignty negotiations and compliance with the applicable provisional understandings under the sovereignty formula with the United Kingdom regarding practical aspects of the South Atlantic. Furthermore, it has expressed its willingness to reach new understandings which might be of interest to Argentina and might contribute to creating suitable conditions for the resumption of sovereignty negotiations.

In this respect, Argentina constantly reiterates to the international organizations, other regional and bi-regional fora and to the international community in general its call upon the United Kingdom to agree to the international request to resume the sovereignty negotiations in pursuance of the relevant resolutions and declarations issued by the United Nations and the OAS, and expresses its permanent willingness in that regard. At the same time, the Argentine Government reaffirms its respect for the lifestyle of the islanders as guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution, as well as its commitment to take their interests into consideration, in keeping with the resolutions passed by the United Nations.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Argentine Republic rejects and protests against the British unilateral acts in the area subject to the dispute, which are contrary to the provisions of Resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly, urging the Parties to refrain from unilaterally modifying the situation while the islands are undergoing a decolonization process and which are inconsistent with the provisional understandings under the sovereignty safeguard formula.

The United Kingdom continues to ignore the international mandate calling on both parties to resume negotiations in order to resolve the sovereignty dispute and persists in carrying out unilateral activities in the disputed area, which include the exploration and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources and the conduct of military exercises, including the launch of missiles from the Malvinas Islands.

The Question of the Malvinas Islands in International Organizations and other Regional and Bi-regional Fora

The Argentine Republic’s proactive efforts to obtain from the different international organizations and fora which address the Question of the Malvinas Islands an express recognition that the sovereignty dispute includes the three archipelagos is due to the illegitimate adoption by the United Kingdom of measures with respect to the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands which are different in nature and scope from the (also illegitimate) measures referring strictly to the Malvinas Islands, in spite of the fact that the dispute has always been a single and indivisible conflict with respect to the three archipelagos. The sovereignty dispute over the three archipelagos is evidenced in the sovereignty safeguard formula under which Argentina and the United Kingdom have reached provisional understandings regarding practical issues relating to the South Atlantic.

United Nations:  General Assembly  and Special Committee on Decolonization

The development of the Malvinas Question in the framework of the General Assembly of the United Nations as from 1945 has been analyzed above.

As from 2004, and by virtue of a process of revitalization of the General Assembly, the Question of the Malvinas Islands appears in the permanent agenda and in the Document of the General Assembly Bureau. The issue may be addressed subject to prior notification by a member State, whereupon it will be automatically included in the General Assembly agenda for the next year.

The Special Committee on Decolonization, currently comprising twenty-nine States, adopts a resolution every year which – among other considerations – requests both Governments to consolidate the present process of dialogue and cooperation through the resumption of negotiations, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute as soon as possible.

The draft resolution had been traditionally co-sponsored by the Latin American countries which are members of the Committee: Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador (since 2009) and Nicaragua (2010). Ever since 1996, the draft has been submitted by Chile.

As from 1993, the relevant resolutions are adopted by consensus. These resolutions are referred to the Fourth Committee, where they are adopted together with the Committee’s report which is adopted by consensus without any discussion on the merits. The most recent resolution was adopted on 21 June 2011.

In this regard, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reiterated, in his 28 August 2010 report on the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, that in the case of the Malvinas Islands, the Special Committee on Decolonization and the General Assembly have continued to urge the Governments in question to resume negotiations on relevant matters, including those related to sovereignty.

In addition, it should be recalled that the UN Secretary-General is in charge of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the General Assembly and supported every year by the Special Committee on Decolonization.

Argentina has reiterated to the Secretary-General, through the highest level of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its interest in such good offices. The latest meetings with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, were held on 24 February and 24 June 2010 in New York, and between 12 and 14 June 2011, on the occasion of his visit to Argentina.

In this regard, it should be recalled that, on 6 April 2011, the Foreign Minister Hector Timerman delivered to the UN Secretary-General a note (A/65/812)signed by the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR member countries requesting that he renew his efforts in the fulfilment of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the General Assembly through successive resolutions aimed at resuming negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the dispute.

In the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011, the President of Argentina said:

“Furthermore, and quite related to the injustice we have described arising from the fact that the right of veto is available only to certain countries, five, to be more specific, in the Security Council, we would like to raise here at the United Nations another question that is vital, not only for Argentines. Malvinas, the question of sovereignty over Malvinas is also an acid test for this organization, to determine whether it is possible to apply a policy that is a true reflection of multilateralism and the obligation of all members to abide by the resolutions of this Assembly. Ten of such resolutions have called upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and my country to sit down and negotiate; to talk about our sovereignty. It should be noted that Argentina is by no means demanding compliance with such resolutions by way of recognition of sovereignty. Instead, it is simply asking that some of the 10 United Nations resolutions in this regard be complied with. We could also enumerate the 29 resolutions of the Decolonization Committee, 11 resolutions and 18 declarations of the Organization of American States; the resolutions passed by several fora, Ibero-American fora; Unasur; MERCOSUR; the Meeting of Arab, African Countries; the whole world is demanding, through several resolutions and declarations, that this question be addressed, but the United Kingdom systematically refuses to do so and uses for such purpose its status as a Security Council member holding the right of veto.

The year 2013 will mark the 180th anniversary of the expulsion of Argentines from the Malvinas Islands by military forces; next year it will be 30 years since an episode on which the United Kingdom pivoted, perpetrated by the most terrible dictatorship in memory and of which Argentines were victims. I am proud to be part of a government that is a role model for the world in terms of human rights and prosecution of those responsible for crimes and genocide. That is why I believe that dwelling on that episode is yet another alibi used to evade United Nations resolutions. I ask everyone to look at themselves in the mirror of a future world in which natural resources will be needed and see today how our fishing and oil natural resources are being extracted and unlawfully appropriated by those who are not entitled to do so. It goes without saying that nobody can claim ownership of an overseas territory that is more than 14,000 km away; this is clearly an illegal occupation. Still, we call once again upon the United Kingdom to comply with UN resolutions; a series of true provocations have taken place recently, missile launching tests in May and July, which were denounced even before the IMO. I would like to convey once again to this Assembly and to the United Nations Argentina’s interest in engaging in dialogue; although it is also true that it has already been a long time. We would like to express at this Assembly that we are going to wait for a reasonable additional amount of time; but if nothing happens, we will have no choice but to start revising the provisional understandings that are still in force, placing special emphasis on the fact that the question of sovereignty must be included in those obligations.

You may be wondering what I am talking about: the joint declaration and exchange of notes of 14 July 1999 establishing the resumption of a weekly scheduled flight operated by LAN Chile between Punta Arenas and the Malvinas Islands with two monthly stopovers, one in each direction, in Río Gallegos.

Argentina does not intend to worsen anyone’s situation, but it is also just for the Assembly and the United Kingdom to become aware that it is necessary to comply with the resolutions. We cannot wait 180 years, 30 years, just like Palestine cannot spend decades and decades trying to have a place in the world; Argentines cannot wait any longer to stake their claim over this territory, which is lawfully ours.”

Organization of American States

The General Assembly of the Organization of American States passed a resolution every year between 1982 and 1992, and since 1993, it has adopted a declaration every year which establishes that the Question of the Malvinas Islands is of permanent hemispheric interest; calls upon Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in order to find, as soon as possible, a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute; expresses its satisfaction at the reaffirmation of the Argentine Government’s willingness to continue exploring all the possible avenues to reach a peaceful solution to the dispute, and, especially, its positive considerations on the inhabitants of the Malvinas islands; and decides to continue to examine the question through to its definitive solution.

The most recent declaration was passed on 7 June 2011, during the 41st Period of sessions of the OAS. Ever since the 37th period of sessions, the General Assembly has expressly declared that the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom refers to “the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas”.

Ibero-American Summits

The Ibero-American Summits which gather the Heads of State and Government of the 19 Ibero-American countries and of Spain and Portugal, have reiterated every year since 2000, through a special communiqué, the need for Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume, as soon as possible, negotiations towards a prompt solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, pursuant to the resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and the provisions and objectives of the UN Charter, including the territorial integrity principle.

The Communiqué issued at the 21st Ibero-American Summit held in Asunción, Paraguay, on 28-29 October 2011, reiterates the customary declaration and underscores that unilateral activities in the disputed area, which include the exploration and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources and the conduct of military exercises – including the launch of missiles from the Malvinas Islands – are contrary to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/49 and incompatible with the search for a peaceful and definitive solution to the dispute. Furthermore, it points out the successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling upon the Secretary-General to employ good offices efforts aimed at the resumption of negotiations that seek to find a peaceful solution to the aforesaid dispute as soon as possible.

MERCOSUR

On 25 June 1996, MERCOSUR Member Countries, Bolivia and Chile, expressed in the Declaration of Potrero de los Funes their full support for Argentina’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute related to the Question of the Malvinas Islands, thus conveying a clear message from the sub-regional bloc on the need to reach a solution to the dispute. This support was reiterated in the Asunción Declaration on 15 June 1999 and continues to be expressed through the Joint Communiqués of the Presidents of MERCOSUR States Parties and Associated States issued every six months on the occasion of the meetings of the MERCOSUR Common Market Council.

Since 2005, those communiqués also reiterate that the pretence to consider the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands as countries and territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Decisions of the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories implementing it apply is inconsistent with the existence of a sovereignty dispute over such archipelagos.

The Argentine President and the Presidents of MERCOSUR Member and Associated States, in the city of San Juan, Argentine Republic, on 3 August 2010, on the occasion of the 39th Meeting of the Common Market Council, in addition to issuing a new Joint Communiqué, made a Special Declaration rejecting the exploration of non-renewable natural resources on the Argentine continental shelf conducted by the United Kingdom, and by which they undertook, pursuant to international law, maritime law and the respective domestic rules, not to facilitate the activities of vessels intended to directly support hydrocarbon activities that affect the rights of the Argentine Republic on its continental shelf.

On 17 December 2010, in Foz de Iguazú, Argentine Republic, MERCOSUR Member and Associated States issued a new Joint Communiqué supporting Argentina and a Special Declaration reiterating their condemnation of the exploration and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources on the Argentine continental shelf carried out by the United Kingdom, and by which they reaffirmed, within the framework of international agreements, their commitment to inform the Argentine Government of their vessels or naval artefacts whose routes include the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and with cargo to be used for hydrocarbon or mining activities on the Argentine continental shelf. They also reaffirmed their commitment (decided on at UNASUR) to adopt, pursuant to international law and their respective domestic legislations, all measures susceptible of being regulated to prevent access to their port by vessels that carry the illegal flag of the islands. Furthermore, they expressed their condemnation of British military exercises on the Malvinas Islands, and ratified the declarations of MERCOSUR, UNASUR, the Río Group and the Ibero-American Summit.

On the occasion of the 41st Meeting of the Common Market Council and Summit of MERCOSUR Presidents held in the City of Asunción on 28 and 29 June 2011, MERCOSUR Member and Associated States emphatically rejected the regrettable statements made by the UK Secretary of State for Defence regarding the sending of fighter planes and war ships to the Malvinas Islands area; contended that such statements evince, once more, an attitude that is at odds with the region’s firm decision to support the Argentine Republic in its permanent search, through dialogue, of a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, and reiterated their endorsement to the legitimate and imprescriptible rights of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.

On 20 December 2011, on the occasion of the 42nd Meeting of the Common Market Council and the Summit of Presidents of MERCOSUR held in Montevideo, the Presidents of MERCOSUR Member and Associated States reiterated the commitment that they had undertaken to adopt, pursuant to international law and to their respective internal laws, all measures susceptible of being regulated in order to prevent access to their ports of vessels flying the illegal flag of the Malvinas Islands. Furthermore, they pointed out that any vessels previously denied access to any port of the region must avoid requesting access to the ports of the other MERCOSUR Member States and Associated States while they fly such flag. Otherwise, the measures provided for in the first paragraph of this declaration will be applied to those vessels, pursuant to international law and to the respective domestic laws.

ALADI

On 11 March 2008, in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) adopted a declaration whereby it supports the Argentine Republic’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute over the ‘Question of the Malvinas Islands’” and ratifies the “regional interest in finding as soon as possible a resolution to the sovereignty dispute between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands in accordance with the relevant UN and OAS resolutions.”

South American Summits

The First South American Summit adopted the following Declaration on the Malvinas Islands: “The Meeting of South American Presidents, held in Brasilia between 31 August and 1 September 2000, confirms that the colonial situation in the Malvinas Islands subsists in the South Atlantic. Convinced that the maintenance of colonial situations is inconsistent with the ideals of peace, security and cooperation in the subcontinent, the Meeting of Presidents agrees on the need for both Parties to resume negotiations in order to find, as soon as possible, a peaceful and lasting solution to the sovereignty dispute, in accordance with the relevant UN and OAS Resolutions.” The Third South American Summit, which took place in Cuzco on 8 December 2004, reiterated in similar terms its support for Argentina’s legitimate rights.

South American Community of Nations

The Presidents assembled in the Second Summit of Heads of State of the South American Community of Nations, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, on 9 December 2006, reiterated their support for the Argentine Republic’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Question of the Malvinas Islands and emphatically encouraged the parties to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a fair, peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, pursuant to the relevant resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Decolonization and the Organization of American States.

First South American Energy Summit

The Argentine Government’s decision to terminate the provisional agreement on hydrocarbons was supported by the twelve countries that participated in the First South American Energy Summit held in Margarita Island, Venezuela, in which Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Ecuador, Chile, Guyana, Surinam, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia signed on 17 April 2007 the “Presidential Declaration on the Malvinas Islands” for the purpose of reaffirming their support for the Argentine Republic’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom and endorsing the decision of the Argentine Government with regard to the provisional agreement.

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

The Presidential Summits of UNASUR, an organization set up in 2008 to replace the South American Community of Nations, have issued since 2009 communiqués reiterating their support for the Argentine Republic’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the Question of the Malvinas Islands and recalling the permanent regional interest in seeing the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas, pursuant to the relevant resolutions and declarations of the UN and of the OAS. In that regard, they highlight the permanent constructive attitude and willingness of the Argentine Government to reach, through negotiations, a definitive solution to this outdated colonial situation in the Americas. In addition, they state that the inclusion of the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands in the Overseas Countries and Territories Association regime of the European Union is inconsistent with the Argentine Republic’s legitimate rights and with the existence of a sovereignty dispute over such archipelagos.

The “Declaration on the Question of the Malvinas Islands” issued on 4 May 2010 in Los Cardales, Province of Buenos Aires rejects the activities regarding exploration of non-renewable natural resources in the Argentine continental shelf carried out by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in clear opposition to the provisions of Resolution 31/49 of the UN General Assembly calling upon both parties to refrain from adopting decisions involving unilateral modifications to the situation while the islands undergo the process recommended by the General Assembly.

UNASUR issued on 12 October 2010 a Declaration on UK military activities on the Malvinas Islands, which rejects the conduct of such exercises, as they are entirely at odds with the region’s policy to search for a solution to the dispute only through peaceful means pursuant to the calls of the international community and UNGA Resolution 31/49.

In the Declaration on Cooperation with regard to relevant movements of vessels whose route includes the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, issued in the 4th Summit held in Georgetown, Guyana, on 26 November 2010, UNASUR Member Countries undertook to adopt, pursuant to International law and their respective domestic legislations, any measures susceptible of being regulated to prevent access to their ports by vessels that carry the illegal flag of the Malvinas Islands. Furthermore, they undertook, within the framework of the international agreements in force, to inform the Argentine Government of any vessels or naval artefacts whose routes include the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and with cargo intended for illegal hydrocarbon and/or mining activities on the Argentine continental shelf, and in this way prevent or avoid the consolidation of such activities.

On 6 April 2011, the Foreign Minister Hector Timerman delivered to the UN Secretary-General a note (A/65/812)signed by the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR member countries requesting him to renew his efforts in the fulfilment of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the General Assembly through successive resolutions aimed at resuming negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the dispute.

On 29 October 2011, in Asunción, Paraguay, the Member States of UNASUR, aware of the announcement by British military forces on the sending of the frigate HMS Montrose to the South Atlantic for a term of six months in order to maintain a “reassuring presence in the region” and to protect “British interests”, reiterated their rejection of British military presence in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, as well as their previous declarations and their firm support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Central American Integration System (SICA)

At the Extraordinary Meeting of the President of the Argentine Republic and the Heads of State and Government of Central America, the Dominican Republic and Belize, held in San José, Costa Rica, on 4 December 2000, a Joint Declaration was issued, which reaffirms in paragraph 27 the need for the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume, as soon as possible, negotiations towards finding a prompt solution to the sovereignty dispute related to the Question of the Malvinas Islands, pursuant to the provisions, objectives and resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, including the territorial integrity principle.

Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean (CALC)

The Heads of State and Government of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, assembled in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on 16-17 December 2008, on the occasion of the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development, reiterated that the Question of the Malvinas Islands is an issue of permanent hemispheric importance and reaffirmed the need for the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume, as soon as possible, negotiations on the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, for the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to this prolonged dispute, in the context of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonization, as well as the repeated resolutions and declarations on the same issue approved by the OAS General Assembly.

In the Joint Declaration on the Argentine Republic’s Legitimate Rights in the Sovereignty Dispute over the Question of the Malvinas Islands, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 6 November 2009, the CALC reiterated the terms of the summit of Heads of State and Government and stated that the inclusion of the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands in the “Overseas Countries and Territories Association” regime is inconsistent with the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic and with the existence of a sovereignty dispute over those archipelagos.”

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)

“SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE ON THE MALVINAS ISLANDS

1. The Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) reiterate their strongest support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, and that the permanent interest of the countries of the region is for the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon possible a peaceful and definitive solution to such dispute, pursuant to the relevant pronouncements of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and of the Organization of American States (OAS), as expressed in previous declarations of the Río Group and of the Latin American and Caribbean Summit (CALC), especially the Declaration of the Riviera Maya Summit, Mexico, 23 February 2010, which are part of the historical heritage of CELAC.

2. Furthermore, they reiterate the importance of observing the provisions of United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 31/49 which calls upon both parties to refrain from adopting decisions that entail the introduction of unilateral modifications to the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended by the General Assembly.

3. They highlight the permanent constructive attitude and willingness of the Argentine Government to reach, by way of negotiations, a peaceful and definitive solution to this anachronistic colonial situation on American soil.

4. In this regard, the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) instruct the Presidency Pro Tempore to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, to renew his efforts to fulfil the good offices mission commissioned by the General Assembly through successive resolutions for negotiations to be resumed so as to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the dispute and to report on the progress achieved in the fulfilment of such mission.

5. The Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) thank the Presidency Pro Tempore for its efforts.”

Rio Group

The Rio Group has expressed its opinion on the Question of the Malvinas Islands since 1993. It regularly issues declarations supporting Argentina’s legitimate rights in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and also expressing that the inclusion of the South Atlantic islands in the association regime of the European Union is inconsistent with the existence of a sovereignty dispute over such islands.

On the occasion of the discussion of the Question of the Malvinas Islands by the UN Committee on Decolonization, the Representative of the country in charge of the Secretariat of the Group in the relevant year participates in the discussions on behalf of the group.

On 15 October 2010, the Río Group issued in Santiago de Chile a Declaration on UK military activities on the Malvinas islands in view of the communiqué forwarded by British military forces to Argentine authorities on 8 October 2010 informing of a project to launch missiles from the territory of the Malvinas Islands. The Río Group rejects the conduct of such exercises as they are at odds with the region’s policy to search for a solution to the dispute through peaceful means pursuant to the calls of the international community and the provisions of UNGA Resolution 31/49.

Second South America-Africa Summit

The summit was held in Margarita Island, Venezuela, on 26-27 September 2009, and a declaration was issued there urging the United Kingdom and Argentina to continue negotiations in order to find a fair, peaceful and definitive solution to the dispute over the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and other regional and international organizations.

Summit of South American- Arab Countries

Since 2005, the declarations of the Summit of South American-Arab Countries have included a paragraph calling on the parties to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute related to the Question of the Malvinas Islands and expressed that the inclusion of the South Atlantic islands in the association regime of the European Union is inconsistent with the existence of a sovereignty dispute over such islands. The most recent Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the South American and Arab countries was issued in Doha, Qatar, on 31 March 2009.

South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone

The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone was established in 1986 by the countries of the western coast of Africa and those bordered by the South Atlantic in Latin America. The 24 countries seek forms of regional integration and cooperation. At the meeting held in Luanda, Angola, on 18-19 July 2007, they issued a declaration calling upon Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations pursuant to Resolution No. 2065(XX) of the General Assembly and other relevant UN resolutions in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful and lasting solution to the sovereignty dispute.

The Group of 77 and China

A declaration was issued by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of 77 Member Countries and China, assembled in Doha, Qatar, on the occasion of the Second South Summit held on 14-16 June 2005, reaffirming the need for the Government of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations, pursuant to the principles and objectives of the UN Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to find, as soon as possible, a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute related to the “Question of the Malvinas Islands”, which seriously affects the Argentine Republic’s economic capabilities.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Group of 77 and China met at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 23 September 2011 on the occasion of their Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting adopted a similar Declaration stressing, in addition, the need for both parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended by the General Assembly.

The Question of the Malvinas Islands in the context of the European Union (EU)

The Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine Antarctic Sector are not European Union overseas territories.

The 1957 Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), laid down in its Fourth Part special provisions regarding the association of certain non-European overseas countries and territories (OCT) listed in the then-current Annex 4 (Annex II in subsequent Treaties).

The UK Accession Treaty to the European Community, which entered into force on 1 January 1973, incorporated the British overseas countries and territories into the Annex, including the Argentine territories “Malvinas Islands and their dependencies” (South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands) and the so-called “British Antarctic Territory.”

Argentina’s initial complaint was made on 6 July 1972 before each of the Member States signatories to the UK accession treaty to the European Communities (EC), expressing its reservation with regard to the inclusion of parts of the Argentine territory in Annex 4 to the Rome Treaty.

The aim of this association, which has remained the same to this date, is to promote the economic and social development of the overseas countries and territories and the establishment of close economic relations between them and the European Union as a whole.

This association regime is only applicable to non-European countries and territories that maintain special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. OCTs (including the Argentine territories illegitimately occupied by the United Kingdom) are not part of the European Union, nor of its territory, and, therefore, they are not subject to EU law. They are only associated with the EU by virtue of the special relations they maintain with the above-referenced countries.

The “Treaty of Lisbon” introduced certain modifications to the existing treaties (the European Union Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community), which are still in force. The reformed treaties are respectively known as the Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and do not have constitutional status.

With regard to the treatment of the “Association of Overseas Countries and Territories”, the Treaty of Lisbon only introduced non-substantive modifications to bring the text of those articles into line with the rest of the articles. Therefore, there were no changes in the treatment or in the list of OCTs and that is why Argentina’s complaint subsists.

On the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1 December 2009, Argentina made new submissions rejecting the pretence to include portions of the Argentine national territory – the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine Antarctic Sector – in the list of territories to which the association rules provided for in the Fourth Part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply (Annex II of such Treaty).

The Argentine territories that are subject to the sovereignty dispute acknowledged by the United Nations are in a special situation, which differs from that of other Overseas Countries and Territories and must therefore be reflected in the treatment given by the European Union, because their future is inextricably linked to the settlement of that sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Situation of the Provisional Understandings
Confidence-building measures in the military field

Confidence-building measures in the military field applied to the disputed area were initially adopted as annexes to the Joint Statement of Madrid of 15 February 1990. They were subsequently reviewed and gradually simplified through the Joint Statements of 25 September 1991 and 12 July 1993 and the Joint Communiqué of 19 July 1994.

The main confidence-building measures include:

a) The “Transitory System of Reciprocal Information and Consultation”.

b) The “Direct Communication System”.

c)  Reciprocal conduct rules for military units working in close proximity.

d) Procedures for maritime and air search and rescue (SAR).

e) System for the exchange of information on safety and control of maritime and air navigation.

f) Working Group on South Atlantic Matters.

Conservation of fishing resources in the South Atlantic

By virtue of the “Joint Declaration on Conservation of Fishing Resources” of 28 November 1990, the Argentine and British Governments undertook the commitment to cooperate on the maintenance and conservation of five fish populations in the South Atlantic.

It should be noted that there is no provisional understanding under any formula authorizing joint activities related to the joint administration of fishing resources in the maritime areas surrounding the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, since the Argentine Republic does not recognize the United Kingdom as a coastal state in the South Atlantic.

Notwithstanding the actions of cooperation under the sovereignty formula with regard to conservation of fishing resources, the Argentine Republic has made repeated protests against successive British unilateral acts in this matter, including the establishment of pretended maritime jurisdictions around the Malvinas Islands in 1986 and 1990, and around the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands in 1993, the sale of fishing licences since 1987, the unilateral removal in 1994 of the temporary full ban on fishing imposed on the area described in the Annex to the Joint Declaration of 28 November 1990 and to the west of such area, and the establishment of quotas on fishing resources in waters surrounding the Malvinas Islands in 2005. This measure amounts to a long-term illegal and unilateral form of disposal of fishing resources in the disputed maritime areas.

Argentina had repeatedly warned the United Kingdom that it would reject any further unilateral British measures, especially those aimed at making a long-term disposition of fishing resources that are under a sovereignty dispute. Argentina had also warned the United Kingdom that the adoption of such a measure would seriously affect cooperation in the South Atlantic Fishing Commission (SAFC). The Argentine rejection of this measure was reflected in the Joint Press Release issued by the 27th South Atlantic Fisheries Commission Meeting in London on 15 July 2005. In addition, on 3 and 29 June 2005, Argentina sent to the United Kingdom its formal protest against the intended adoption of such measure. Finally, once the United Kingdom adopted the measure, Argentina formally rejected and protested against it on 27 October 2005.

In the Official Gazette of 20 June 2008, the Argentine Government, relying on the actions provided for by the legal framework applicable to this situation, published Law No. 26,386 to deal with companies exploiting fishing resources in the Argentina Exclusive Economic Zone without the relevant permit. The Argentine Republic will continue to use its best efforts to preserve fishing resources in the South Atlantic.

Britain’s unilateral actions described above contradicted the objectives and purposes of the Joint Declaration and of the Commission. Furthermore, none of Argentina’s claims reflected in the Joint Press Releases of the SAFC have been adequately addressed by the United Kingdom thus far.

These unilateral measures adopted by Britain, which were rejected and protested against by the Argentine Republic, are contrary, in particular, to Resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly urging both Parties to the dispute to refrain from adopting unilateral modifications to the situation while a resolution of the dispute is pending and asking them to resume bilateral negotiations in compliance with Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly and other relevant resolutions of such organization.

For that reason, the Argentine Government proposed for the 28th Meeting of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission a draft agenda aimed at discussing the SAFC mandate and the extent to which it is affected by the prolonged series of British unilateral measures. The meeting was held on 6 December 2005. However, no agreement was reached with the British Delegation on the adoption of the agenda proposed by the Argentine Delegation. Following such disagreement between the parties on the agenda, SAFC has not met again and all cooperation mechanisms provided for in the Joint Declaration of 28 November 1990 have been suspended.

On 6 and 7 September 2006, a Special Diplomatic Meeting between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom was held for the purpose of analyzing the mandate of the SAFC. On 14 and 15 March 2007, a Second Special Diplomatic Meeting was held in Buenos Aires, but no agreement was reached.

Exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the South West Atlantic

On 27 March 2007, the Argentine Government notified the UK Government through a note from the Argentine Foreign Minister to the British Foreign Secretary of its decision to terminate the Argentine-British Joint Declaration on “Cooperation in Offshore Activities in the Southwest Atlantic” signed by Argentina and the United Kingdom on 27 September 1995 under the sovereignty safeguard formula and related to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the area subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction dispute.

The substantial divergence between the parties relates to the spatial scope of cooperation for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, which, according to the Joint Declaration, had to be carried out in the “maritime areas of the Southwest Atlantic subject to a sovereignty and jurisdiction dispute” (the 430,000 km2 area of the Malvinas Islands). The United Kingdom, however, intended to restrict cooperation with Argentina to “a special cooperation area” of only 21,000 km2 created pursuant to the agreement and to reserve for its unilateral actions the rest of the disputed area around the Malvinas Islands.

At the last meeting of the Southwest Atlantic Hydrocarbons Commission created by the Joint Declaration, held in July 2000, both Parties produced a written statement referring to the subsistence of their divergent interpretations with regard to the Declaration and agreed to allow time for reflection in an attempt to solve them.

The United Kingdom’s repeated unilateral activities in the disputed area, including the award of hydrocarbon exploration blocks, and its reluctance to hold an open dialogue on the provisional agreements, led the Argentine Government to consider the reflection exercise opened in 2000 exhausted and to terminate the agreement.

The Argentine Government’s decision to terminate the provisional agreement on hydrocarbons was supported by the twelve countries that participated in the First South American Energy Summit held in Margarita Island, Venezuela, at which Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Ecuador, Chile, Guyana, Surinam, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia signed the “Presidential Declaration on the Malvinas Islands” on 17 April 2007.

Furthermore, on 2 February 2010, the Argentine Government submitted a protest note to the United Kingdom, rejecting its attempt to authorize hydrocarbon exploration activities in the areas surrounding the Malvinas Islands by means of the Ocean Guardian platform. Such protest note has circulated as an official document of the United Nations and the OAS.

In this respect, the Special Communiqué on Hydrocarbon Exploration on the Continental Shelf, approved by the Heads of State and Government on the occasion of the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit held in Cancun, Mexico, on 22 and 23 February 2010, should be highlighted.

The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs also submitted protests to the countries in whose territories the companies that contributed to the transportation of the Ocean Guardian platform or that received concessions for the exploration works are established. At the same time, letters of discouragement were sent to the companies involved in such activities.

Furthermore, in the context of the specific measures aimed at discouraging and avoiding the illegitimate exploitation of its natural resources, the Argentine Government issued the Presidential Decree No. 256/2010, which applies to the navigation of vessels and naval artefacts between ports located in the mainland and in the disputed islands, and whose Application Regulations were published on 26 April 2010 in the Official Gazette. The aforesaid Presidential Decree is currently in the course of implementation.

In this regard, Law No. 26659, passed on 16 March 2011 and published on 13 April 2011 should be recalled, which sets forth the conditions for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation on the Argentine Continental Shelf and provides for penalties ranging between 5 and 20 years of licence suspension.

Air and sea communications between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands

The Joint Declaration of 14 July 1999 allowed the Chilean airline LAN AIRLINES to operate a scheduled, weekly flight between Punta Arenas and the Malvinas Islands with two monthly stopovers in Río Gallegos on the inbound and outbound flights respectively. This is the only commercial flight between the mainland and the islands in accordance with a provisional understanding under the sovereignty formula with the United Kingdom as part of the air transport agreements in force between the Argentine Republic and Chile.

This means that, as Chile recognises the Malvinas Islands as Argentine territory, the legs between Punta Arenas and Río Gallegos and between Punta Arenas and the Malvinas Islands constitute international flights between Argentina and Chile, while the Río Gallegos-Malvinas Islands leg is considered to be a domestic route within Argentine territory, for which LAN Chile, by Decree 1179/2002, is entitled to an exception to the rule that domestic routes are to be served by Argentine flag carriers exclusively.

In addition, in the summer (November to March) of 1999-2003, Argentina authorized non-scheduled flights between third countries (mainly Chile) and the Malvinas Islands operated by third-nation flag carriers (mainly LAN Chile). During almost all this period the British Party was reminded of the growing difficulty for Argentina to continue authorizing this type of flights and of the need to start discussions on air communications between the mainland and the Malvinas Islands. These non-scheduled flights are not contemplated in any provisional understanding with the United Kingdom and their authorization is a unilateral action by Argentina based on a case-by-case assessment.

Within this framework, on 3 November 2003, the United Kingdom and the other countries involved were informed that the Argentine Republic would not thenceforth authorise non-scheduled flights between third countries and the Malvinas Islands operated by third-nation flag carriers. This measure does not apply to scheduled flights provided for in the Joint Declaration of 14 July 1999, private flights covered by the Agreement by Exchange of Notes of 23 February 2001, flights used for medical evacuation, nor to emergency situations.

On 3 November 2003 as well, the Argentine Republic made a proposal to the United Kingdom on the possibility of reaching a provisional understanding under the sovereignty formula on “the establishment of scheduled direct air services between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands operated by Argentine airlines”. On 7 November 2003, the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom agreed to exchange points of view regarding the Argentine proposal and other ideas for the development of air connections between the Malvinas Islands and the mainland.

On 17 February 2004, the Argentine Foreign Minister and the then Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office, Bill Rammell, agreed on a series of guidelines to be followed in all future negotiations on the issue. However, on 2 March 2004, a British proposal was made, which did not adjust to these guidelines, and was thus immediately rejected by the Argentine party. Since then, a new British proposal consistent with the agreed guidelines is being awaited.

Access to the islands by Argentine passport holders

The Joint Declaration of 14 July 1999 re-established access to the Malvinas Islands by mainland Argentine citizens upon presentation of valid Argentine passports. Meanwhile, the Agreement by Exchange of Notes of 3 May 2002 re-established access by mainland Argentine citizens to the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands on the same conditions that apply in the case of the Malvinas Islands.

Construction of a Monument to the Argentine War Dead in the Malvinas Islands

Under the Joint Declaration of 14 July 1999, the two governments agreed on the construction in the cemetery of Darwin, Malvinas Islands, of a monument to the members of the Argentine Armed Forces who died in action during the 1982 conflict. The monument was a private undertaking of the Commission of Families of War Dead in Malvinas and the South Atlantic Islands, and its construction was agreed through diplomatic negotiations. The monument was built between February and April 2004 and in March 2005 a delegation of the Commission visited the Malvinas Islands to witness the completion of the work.

On 3 and 10 October 2009, relatives of the war dead travelled to the Malvinas Islands for the purpose of unveiling the monument to the members of the Argentine Armed Forces dead in action in 1982, which stands in the Darwin cemetery and which had been built in 2004 in accordance with one of the commitments undertaken by Argentina and the United Kingdom through the Joint Declaration of 14 July 1999.

In total, 320 relatives and 55 accompanying persons travelled on the weekly scheduled flight operated since 1999 by the Chilean company LAN AIRLINES between Punta Arenas (Chile) and the Malvinas Islands, which makes two monthly stopovers in Río Gallegos, on the inbound and the outbound flight respectively.

Delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea provided for the creation of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, to which the Parties must submit their proposal for the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.

It should be recalled that, at the time of ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea on 1 December 1995, the Argentine Republic expressed its reservation on the Question of the Malvinas Islands.

Law No. 24815 created the Argentine Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which drafted a definitive proposal on the outer limit of the continental shelf, allowing the Argentine Republic to consolidate the exercise of sovereignty rights over the natural resources of approximately 1,000,000 km2 beyond two hundred nautical miles, a natural reserve of energy and mineral resources of great strategic and economic importance.

On 8 and 20 June 2001, the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom signed an Agreement by Exchange of Notes under the sovereignty formula on the exchange of information concerning the preparatory activities of the respective presentations to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In this regard, two meetings were held in Buenos Aires in June 2001 and in December 2004.

In this context, in November 2004 the first campaign of scientific data collection to the northwest of the Malvinas Islands was carried out.

On 21 April 2009, the Argentine Republic, after 12 specific campaigns and relying on the scientific information available in pursuance of Argentine Law No. 20489 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf the documents supporting its submission regarding the outer limit of the continental shelf for the entire Argentine territory.

Argentina thus performed an act of sovereign affirmation of its rights over a vast 1,782,645-km2 territory of Argentine continental shelf stretching beyond its exclusive economic zone and all throughout the natural area of its mainland territory, the islands of the South Atlantic and the Argentine Antarctic Sector, in addition to 4,799,732 km2, up to 200 miles.

It should be noted that the Commission will not examine submissions related to the Malvinas, South Georgias  and South Sandwich Islands made by Argentina and the United Kingdom pursuant to ANNEX I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, which provides that the commission will not consider or qualify submissions related to areas under sovereignty disputes.

Analysis of the toponymy of the Malvinas Islands

Pursuant to the provisions of the Argentine-British Joint Declaration under the sovereignty formula of 14 July 1999, which establishes that the Argentine government is willing to analyze the question of toponymy in the Malvinas Islands, and that, with that purpose in mind, it will continue its consultations with the appropriate national institutions, by Joint Resolution of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship and of Defence on 10 November 2000, the “Interministerial Commission for the Analysis of the Toponymy in the Malvinas Islands” was set up, composed of the Director General of Malvinas and South Atlantic, the Director of the Military Geographic Institute and the Head of the Naval Hydrographic Service.

In this framework, the Military Geographic Institute (replaced by the Argentine Geographic Institute)  transferred to the Naval Hydrographic Service a segment of the System of Geographic Information (SIG), to which that Service added additional geographical and hydrographic details, apart from carrying out a survey of the historical, geographical and cartographic documentary sources that provided the basis for imposing and using each Argentine geographical name and the determination of the exact coordinates of each geographical accident named in the Malvinas Islands.

The Geography Department of the Argentine Geographic Institute, along with the Toponymy Division of the Naval Hydrography Service, drew up the standard nomenclature of the Malvinas Islands toponymy on the basis of 1 500 000 scale maps containing, among other data, the specific term, generic term, geographic coordinates and location.  Such nomenclature has been uploaded, for its dissemination, to the websites of both agencies (www.ign.gob.ar and www.hidro.gov.ar).

The expansion of the Malvinas Islands nomenclature to 1:250 000 scale is currently in development, as well as the incorporation of the validated toponymy to official maps, which is being carried out by the Argentine Geographic Institute along with the Toponymy Division of the Naval Hydrography Service.

Feasibility study on landmine clearance in the Malvinas Islands

Following a complex negotiation process that led Argentina and the United Kingdom to sign on 11 October 2001 an Agreement by Exchange of Notes under the sovereignty safeguard formula to conduct a feasibility study on landmine clearance in the Malvinas Islands, aimed at complying with the obligations assumed by the Argentine Republic under the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Treaty).

The feasibility study was carried out by both Governments through a Joint Working Group. Both Governments bore the costs of conducting the feasibility study, in proportion to the unexploded landmines and ammunition attributable to each party.

On 3 August 2006, the Agreement by Exchange of Notes was signed under the sovereignty safeguard formula in addition to the Agreement of 11 October 2001, which provided for the inclusion of the unexploded ammunition placed in the mined areas into the subject-matter of the Feasibility Study and a procedure to hire a private company to carry out certain tasks provided for in the Main Study stage, as well as field work in the Malvinas Islands. Such agreement, entered into in compliance with the 2001 and 2006 agreements, was signed with Cranfield University in November 2006.

In December 2006, the contractor’s experts monitored by two military experts per country carried out field works in the Malvinas Islands. During the subsequent meetings of the Joint Working Group, the Group and Cranfield University worked towards the preparation of a report that satisfied the requirements fixed by the two Agreements by Exchange of Notes under the sovereignty safeguard formula and the 2006 agreement. On 5 October 2007, Argentina and the United Kingdom exchanged notes approving the documents agreed upon in the context of the Joint Working Group.

At the 8th Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention (Jordan, 17-22 November 2007), the Argentine and UK delegations submitted separately, in a plenary session, the final report that resulted from the efforts of the Joint Working Group.

At a plenary meeting during the second Review Conference of the Ottawa Treaty held in Cartagena, Colombia, on 29 November-4 December 2009, Argentina’s request for a 10-year extension in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Ottawa Treaty was granted.

In the national report provided for in Article 7 of the Ottawa Treaty for the year 2009, submitted in April 2010 to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva, Argentina reiterated that it cannot implement Article 5 of the Convention in the mined areas in the Malvinas Islands, because it “does not exercise territorial control over the area to be demined.”

Websites of interest

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UN Human Rights Council Brings to an End the First Cycle for Universal Periodic Review

UN Human Rights Council Brings to an End the First Cycle for Universal Periodic Review


Today marks the beginning of the 19th session of the Human Rights Council, scheduled to run from February 27 to March 23, 2012. This session will also mark the official end of the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review mechanism, which has seen all 193 member states of the UN undergo a review of their human rights record, creating a baseline for future reviews. The unofficial end of “UPR” (as it is known) happened in October 2011, but with the adoption of the last remaining reports at the 19th session, the international community is officially at a point where we can look back on the first run-through of this new mechanism and discuss changes for the second.


Universal periodic review was one of the proposals made in the lead-up to the World Summit of 2005, with the outcome of the World Summit confirming the creation of a standing Human Rights Council out of the ashes of the old part-time Commission on Human Rights (A/RES/60/1). The idea of the Council serving as a “chamber of peer review” to evaluate the fulfilment by all states of all their human rights obligations was a proposal backed by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan expanded on the idea in an explanatory note published in May 2005 (A/59/2005/Add.1) as an addendum to his “In Larger Freedom” report of March 2005 (A/59/2005). These reports helped focus the discussions taking place between states as they prepared for the World Summit of September 2005, although it was not until March 2006 when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution specifically on the “Human Rights Council” (as the resolution is entitled), which confirmed that the Council would undertake a universal periodic review (as the mechanism had become known) (A/RES/60/251).


According to operative paragraph 5(e) of UN General Assembly resolution 60/251, universal periodic review would be based on “objective and reliable information” and conducted “in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States.” It was also promised that the “review shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned, and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs” and that “such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies.”


The new Human Rights Council was established in 2006, and a year later, in mid-2007, the Council agreed to an “institution-building package” found in Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 containing the specific modalities with respect to its mandates and functions. It is within resolution 5/1 that we find the agreed specifics for universal periodic review, including the time management rules necessary for ensuring that over 190 states are each reviewed through a consistent process within a four-year period.


These time management aspects include express page limits for the written material, as well as a three-hour time limit (plus an additional hour) for the interactive dialogue component, and even one minute and two minute limits imposed on questions asked by the reviewers (e.g. other states). The review process also makes use of a troika of facilitating rapporteurs for each country under review, with the actual review taking place before the entire 47-member Council acting as a working group of the whole (with observer states also participating). Such specifics were necessary to meet the agreed four-year time limit, and while restrictive, and sometimes limiting information available for each review, UPR has nevertheless produced a baseline for all states for the second cycle, scheduled to run from June 2012 until 2016, with attention to be paid on the implementation of recommendations made during the first cycle that were agreed to by each state while under review.


Clearly one of the goals of UPR has been to ensure that no state is immune from review with respect to its human rights record. While there are similarities between UPR and state reporting to the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, the latter flows from a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty, and not all states are party to all the international human rights treaties adopted under the auspices of the UN. Thus UPR serves to fill in the gaps by reviewing the record of all states in relation to all rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. And the main achievement of UPR has been its rate of state participation, with 98% of states having submitted a written national report, and 80% of states having been represented by a Minister at the oral or “interactive dialogue” stage of the review process.


Another achievement of UPR has been the ready access to information, with almost all states having prepared a national report that can now be accessed by anyone via http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx. In addition, staff at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have been tasked with preparing a compilation of the key findings of the various UN treaty bodies and special procedures relevant to each state under review, with each compilation serving as a useful summary or starting point for further research. There is also a compilation prepared summarizing any and all information received from stakeholders, NGOs and national human rights institutions in preparation for each country’s review before the Council.


We have also seen the prospect of an upcoming review serve as an incentive for states to ratify more human rights treaties or extend an invitation to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council (the term used to refer to the various Special Rapporteurs, Independent Experts, and Working Groups tasked by the Council to investigate specific human rights themes or specific country situations).


UPR, however, is not perfect, and the efforts of states during the second cycle need to focus on the implementation of a state’s human rights obligations (rather than the ratification record on paper) and the promotion of fewer, more specific recommendations (eliminating the vague and broad-brush recommendations that lean more towards political posturing rather than concrete suggestions). I recognize that political considerations are inherent within a political body, with allied states able to engage in a concerted campaign of “gotcha” against one state or another, or getting together to serve as a mutual praise society for each other’s reviews. But I am also not one to overlook the fact that the former Commission on Human Rights had developed a similar “periodic reporting process” in the early 1960s that was eventually abolished because the reports it generated on state performance were ultimately of marginal utility. Thus the content of UPR does matter.


There is also a need to improve the engagement with civil society, although for some countries, this leads to a need for national NGOs to make submissions rather than only international NGOs. In other countries, including my own, there is a need to look beyond the usual suspects as being the entirety of civil society. I have argued elsewhere that Canada, for example, needs to engage beyond the five or so NGOs that appear to be on speed-dial at the Department of Foreign Affairs and reach out to other groups to assess the human rights situation in Canada, in its entirety and within a broader context, including scholarly associations, lawyers handling immigration cases or criminal matters, Bar associations, chambers of commerce, and university researchers, with the latter’s terms of employment (e.g. tenure) being a means to ensure independence from both government and non-governmental organizations. One should also recognize the possibility of input from stakeholders being positive as well as negative.


But admittedly, perhaps the greatest benefit from UPR comes from the self-evaluation that it triggers within government, with the prospect of a future review before the Council leading many states to engage in a process of internal review and inter-ministerial discussion. UPR has also become an important tool for identifying areas where technical assistance and capacity building is needed, with many developing countries making use of the UPR process as a means for identifying where international assistance is needed and providing a basis for making a request to the relevant UN agencies for support. In fact, as I write this post, I am in Suriname, where I am participating in a UNDP-supported collaborative project with the Ministry of Justice and Police to enhance the internal capacity of the civil service with respect to human rights and international human rights reporting.


As the international community moves towards UPR’s second cycle, I hope that there will be more public musings about the positives and negatives of UPR No 1, with a view to making continued and effective use of this mechanism for reviewing all states with respect to all human rights.


 



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The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?

The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?


After deciding the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) case (about which I and others will have more to say on the blog soon), there is the prospect of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) being asked to decide another immunity case. At the summit of the Assembly of the African Union held last week in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African Heads of States and Heads of Government  requested:



“the [AU]  Commission to consider seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the immunities of state officials under international law.”


As has been the pattern over the past three or four years, the AU Assembly has, at its biannual meetings, adopted a number of decisions regarding cases at the  International Criminal Court. In the latest meeting,  the AU Assembly reiterated its request that the UN Security Council defer the proceedings against Sudanese President Bashir in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute. It also “ urge[d] all [AU] Member States to comply with [AU] Assembly Decisions on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against President Bashir of the Sudan pursuant to Article 23(2) of the [AU] Constitutive Act and Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC.” Those prior decisions had called on African States not to comply with the request by the ICC for the arrest and surrender of Bashir.


The AU Assembly’s latest decision on the ICC proceedings are different from prior decisions in that this time around, there is no call for deferral of the ICC proceedings arising out of the situations in Kenya or in Libya (as had been called for in earlier decisions). This absence should be seen as improving the tone of the African reaction to ICC proceedings. It is now clear that the AU’s objections, at least at present, are really only with respect to one case – the Bashir case. The other difference in the AU Assembly decision is the call for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the immunities of State officials under international law. Although the AU decision does not make this clear, presumably what the AU wants is an opinion that would clarify the immunity (or otherwise) of State officials from prosecution by the ICC and from enforcement action taken by States acting at the request of the ICC. Given the context of the decision, it does not seem to be the case that the AU wants the ICJ to rule on the immunity of state officials from the jurisdiction of other States that are not acting at the behest of the ICC. In any case, the ICJ, in the Arrest Warrant Case (DRC v Belgium), has already set out its view on aspects of immunity of state officials from the jurisdiction of other States.


The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ruled, just last December, on the immunity of President Bashir from ICC Prosecution and from arrest in ICC State parties (see my comments on those decisions here). Asking the ICJ to provide an advisory opinion on this issue would be akin to trying to appeal the decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to the ICJ rather than to the ICC Appeals Chamber. It would be an express invitation for judicial confrontation. I discuss below whether there is any real prospect of the ICJ rendering an advisory opinion on the immunity of State officials from ICC prosecution or arrest for the purposes of ICC prosecution. In my view, there is no legal bar to the Court deciding on this issue. The main obstacle would be whether African States can muster enough political support within the United Nations to get the request for an advisory opinion.


AU Commission Press Release on ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity


Prior to the AU Summit, the AU Commission issued a press release on January 9 reacting to the decisions of the ICC regarding the immunity of Bashir. In the Press Release,



“the African Union Commission expresses its deep regret that the decision has the effect of:


(i) Purporting to change customary international law in relation to immunity ratione personae;


(ii) Rendering Article 98 of the Rome Statute redundant, non-operational and meaningless;


(iii) Making a decision per incuriam by referring to decisions of the African Union while grossly ignoring the provisions of Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, to which Chad and Malawi are State Parties, and which obligate all AU Member States ‘to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union’.”


With regard to point (1) the AU Commission takes exception to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision that “that customary international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the commission of international crimes.” The AU Commission argues that:



“As a general matter, the immunities provided for by international law apply not only to proceedings in foreign domestic courts but also to international tribunals: states cannot contract out of their international legal obligations vis-à-vis third states by establishing an international tribunal. Indeed, contrary to the assertion of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, article 98(1) was included in the Rome Statute establishing the ICC out of recognition that the Statute is not capable of removing an immunity which international law grants to the officials of States that are not parties to the Rome Statute. This is because immunities of State officials are rights of the State concerned and a treaty only binds parties to the treaty. A treaty may not deprive non-party States of rights which they ordinarily possess. In this regard, it is to be recalled that the immunity accorded to senior serving officials, ratione personae, from foreign domestic criminal jurisdiction (and from arrest) is absolute and applies even when the official is accused of committing an international crime.”


As I explained in my post in December commenting on the ICC decision, I agree with these points regarding the applicability of international law immunities before international tribunals. However, I have also argued that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber could simply have said that the effect of the referral of the Darfur situation by the UN Security Council has the consequence that Sudan is bound by the Statute (including by the removal of immunity in Art. 27). The effect of this would mean that Sudan is to be regarded as being in the same position as a State party to the Rome Statute. In its press release, the AU Commission engages with this argument of mine, and disagrees with me. They argue that:



“The Security Council has not lifted President Bashir’s immunity either; any such lifting should have been explicit, mere referral of a “situation” by the UNSC to the ICC or requesting a state to cooperate with the ICC cannot be interpreted as lifting immunities granted under international law. The consequence of the referral is that the Rome Statute, including article 98, is applicable to the situation in Darfur.


Can the ICJ Decide on Immunity of State Officials Sought by the ICC?


The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decisions and the AU Commission response form the background to the AU summits call for an advisory opinion by the ICJ. The AU summit asks the AU Commission to consider seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Under Article 96 of the UN Charter  and Art. 65 of the Statute of the ICJ, only organs of the United Nations or UN specialised agencies may be authorised by the UN General Assembly to request advisory opinions. So the AU Commission cannot itself seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ. For a request to be made,  it would most likely have to come from either the General Assembly or the Security Council. It is unlikely that the Security Council would seek an advisory opinion on this question since the advisory opinion is an attempt to do what the Security Council has thus far failed to do (to stop the case against Bashir). Any request would more likely come from the General Assembly, where African States might be able to muster greater support for an ICJ advisory opinion.


A significant issue that would arise in seeking an advisory opinion would be what question or questions should be put to the ICJ. Christopher Gevers in an interesting post at the War and Law blog notes that:



“If an advisory opinion is sought it could address a broad range of legal issues such as (i) immunity before international courts under international law (although this was addressed obiter in the Arrest Warrant case, it might be further clarified), (ii) immunity under the Rome Statute, both generally and in respect of cooperation obligations on states in particular, and (iii) the effect (if any) of Security Council resolutions referring matters to the Court on (i) and (ii).”


Christopher also explores the different options for taking the matter ot the ICJ and notes that in addition to the advisory opinion route, “Sudan could bring a case against an ICC state party – in particular those countries subject to PTC decisions such as Kenya and Malawi.” The problem with this option is that if the decision goes against Sudan, that State would be bound by the adverse decision.


A further option is that the matter is referred to the ICC Assembly of States Parties under Art. 119(2) of the Rome Statute under which any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the ICC Statute, other than those concerning the judicial functions of the ICC, may be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may either seek to settle the dispute itself or make recommendations as to how it may be settled, including referral to the ICJ. One issue that arises here is whether the dispute should be regarded as concerning a judicial function of the ICC, in which case the Assembly does not have competence to deal with it. In any case, the Assembly cannot itself refer a matter to the ICJ. All  that this provision means is that the Assembly may recommend that disputing parties refer a dispute under the Rome Statute to the ICJ.


Assuming that  a request for an advisory opinion is made by the UN General Assembly, the ICJ would undoubtedly have jurisdiction to render the opinion since the request would deal with a legal question. However, as the ICJ has stressed in several advisory opinions, the fact that it has jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion does not mean that it will. The Court has a discretion to refuse to render an advisory opinion since Article 65 of its Statute only says that it “may” give an advisory opinion requested of it. Though the Court has this discretion it is one that is very rarely exericised. I think I am right in saying that the ICJ has never exercised this discretion though the PCIJ did refuse to render an opinion in the Eastern Carelia case. The Court has stated in many cases that giving advisory opinions requested by UN organs represents the Court’s participation in the activities of the UN and, that in principle, such a request should not be refused. The ICJ has gone on to say that there must be “compelling reasons” for it to exercise this discretion. Even if the request came from the General Assembly, the fact that Bashir case arises out of a Security Council referral to the ICC or that the case would involve interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions referring the situation would not be sufficient grounds for the Court to refuse to give the opinon (see the Kosovo Advisory Opinion).


One issue that might lead the Court to refuse to render an opinion on this question might be considerations of judicial comity. In other words, it remains to be seen whether the Court would be happy to be used as a form of appellate court over the ICC.  Some might feel it inappropriate for the ICJ to be used in this way. There have been different views among ICJ judges as to whether steps can and should be made to put the ICJ at the apex of a judicial structure involving international courts. Judge Guillaume, former ICJ President, was of the view that steps should be taken to allow other internationl courts to request advisory opinions from the ICJ on question of general international law (Guillaume ‘The Future of International Judicial Institutions’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 848 and ‘Advantages and Risks of Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action’ (2004) 2 Journal of Intl Criminal Justice 300). However, Judge Higgins, also a former ICJ President, thought that the suggestion of institutionalising the ICJ as a sort of appeals court (or court to whom others referred questions of general international law) was unworkable (see Higgins, “A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench”, (2006) 55 ICLQ 791). It remains to be seen whether there would be political will to use the ICJ in this way. However, if such will did exist, I would not have thought that it is inconsistent with the ICJ’s role as a Court of Justice for it to decide on matters that have been decided on by other tribunals. For one thing, the ICJ would be able to decide on the matter from the perspective of customary international law without being specifically tied to the provisions of the Rome Statute.



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Argentina to take Falklands row to UN

Argentina to take Falklands row to UN



Cristina Kirchner warns of ‘grave risks to international security’ and states intention to prevent war over natural resources


President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has accused Britain of “militarising” the south Atlantic, and said she would seek UN intervention to prevent a war against Argentina for its natural resources.


The president warned of “grave risks to international security” if what she characterised as Britain’s aggressive colonial impulses were not reined in. “I want to ask the British prime minister to give peace a chance, give peace a chance, not war.”


Fernández spoke at the presidential palace in Buenos Aires in front of a large map of the Falkland Islands painted in the blue and white colours of the Argentinian flag.


The announcement sought to internationalise the dispute and raise pressure on London to discuss sovereignty. But Fernández did not close Argentina’s airspace to flights between Chile and the Falklands, as some islanders had feared.


Britain has dispatched the destroyer HMS Dauntless along with Prince William, a search and rescue pilot, claiming both deployments were routine, amid escalating tension prior to the 30th anniversary of the war. Both sides have accused the other of trying to distract from domestic economic woes.


Fernández summoned politicians and veterans of the 1982 Falklands war for her speech on Las Malvinas. “I have instructed our foreign minister to protest at the UN [against] the militarisation of the south Atlantic which implies a grave risk for international security, precisely when we see in other countries situations that become unmanageable. The coming wars will be for natural resources and Argentina is one of the richest regions in world in those resources,” she said. The president also promised to lift secrecy over a 1982 military report, named after General Benjamin Rattenbach, which was commissioned by Argentina’s former military dictatorship.


Fernández has mobilised much of South America and the Caribbean in a diplomatic and commercial squeeze. Ships flying the Falklands flag are barred from the region’s ports, depriving the islands of bananas and other fresh fruit.


She sought to widen the row by including Spain in the list of British colonial victims. “It is an anachronism in the 21st century to still have colonies, there are only 16 cases in the world, of which 10 are British and we’ve seen in recent days how the Spanish claim regarding Gibraltar has been renewed.”


After a decade of relative calm, tension flared last year when Argentina protested at oil drilling in Falkland waters. Two weeks ago, Argentina’s official news agency, Telam, started a Malvinas page with banner pictures of Argentinian jet fighters, helicopters, tanks and soldiers.


A correspondent for the newspaper Clarin reported harsh sentiments from Stanley on Tuesday. The article quoted islanders referring to “fucking Argies” and was illustrated with a photograph of a gift shop mug with an altered map of South America that replaced Argentina with blue emptiness named “Mierda Sea”. Mierda means “shit” in Spanish.


A summit of leftwing leaders in Venezuela last weekend backed Fernández’s campaign as a pan-regional cause. Her Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chávez, said Caracas would support its ally in a military conflict.


A Foreign Office spokesman said: “The people of the Falkland Islands are British out of choice. They are free to determine their own future and there will be no negotiations with Argentina over sovereignty unless the islanders wish it.”






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